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CONCEPTUALIZING AGGRESSION 
NOAH WEISBORD* 
The special working group tasked by the International Criminal Court’s 
Assembly of States Parties to define the supreme international crime, the 
crime of aggression, has produced a breakthrough draft definition. This 
paper analyzes the key concepts that make up the emerging definition of 
the crime of aggression by developing and applying a future-oriented 
methodology that brings together scenario planning and grounded 
theory. It proposes modifications and interpretations of the constituent 
concepts of the crime of aggression intended to make the definition 
sociologically relevant today and in the foreseeable future. 
INTRODUCTION 
The crime of aggression—individual responsibility for illegal war—is 
one of the core international crimes.1 The Nuremberg Tribunal called 
aggression “the supreme international crime.”2 The judges reasoned that it 
contained within it the accumulated evil of the entire war.3 Aggression has 
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 1. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 246-59 (2001) (including the crime of 
aggression as one of the major international crimes). 
 2. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals 
421 (1946) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment]. 
 3. Id. (“War is essentially an evil thing. . . . To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only 
an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that 
it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”). The IMT found twelve defendants guilty 
of the crime against peace. Id. at 485-528. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo 
convicted twenty-four defendants of aggression. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, reproduced in 103 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE JUDGMENT, SEPARATE 
OPINION, PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS, APPEALS AND REVIEWS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 49,773-49, 851 (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998). 
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also been the most difficult international crime to define.4 It is included in 
the International Criminal Court Statute along with Genocide, Crimes 
Against Humanity, and War Crimes, but it is the only one without a 
definition. Without a definition, it cannot be prosecuted. This article 
examines the current definitional project from the perspective of a 
participant-observer. It wrestles with the imperatives of fidelity to the past 
and preparedness for the future, certainty and flexibility, and the possible 
versus the desirable, which pervade the activity of lawmaking generally. 
The crime of aggression is exceptionally difficult to define because it 
is intertwined with a number of unresolved historical debates within the 
field of international law, such as the distinction between a just and an 
unjust war, the possibility of holding individuals responsible for collective 
acts of political violence,5 and the appropriate relationship of judicial to 
political institutions—such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
the UN Security Council—in the international order.6 Furthermore, the 
definition has political and military repercussions for states and, as a result, 
their negotiation positions tend to reflect their strategic interests, which are 
regularly in competition. Finally, legal scholars and diplomats, wounded by 
repeated setbacks, question the wisdom of the overall project.7 
Proponents of the definitional project anticipate that an implemented 
crime will discourage political and military leaders from using armed force 
as a strategy because it may jeopardize them personally.8 Legal scholar 
Mark Drumbl argues that a definition will carry with it an important 
expressive function.9 Former Nuremberg Prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz 
warns that not implementing the crime at this stage is regressive and that it 
 
 4. See Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 168 (2008) (engaging 
in a brief historical account of the development of the crime of aggression). 
 5. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF 
EVIL (Penguin Books 1994) (1965). 
 6. See generally Carrie McDougall, When Law And Reality Clash—The Imperative of 
Compromise in the Context of the Accumulated Evil of the Whole: Conditions for the Exercise of the 
International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 277 
(2007) (discussing the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the UN Security 
Council). 
 7. See, e.g., Matthias Schuster, The Rome Statute and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian Knot 
in Search of a Sword, 14 CRIM. L.F. 1 (2003) (discussing the difficulties of defining aggression and 
questioning the wisdom of attempting to do so). 
 8. See generally Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent 
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001) (discussing how criminal accusations jeopardize the 
political objectives of those who would use force to realize their ambitions). 
 9. Mark A. Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains?, 41 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 291 (2009). 
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will send a dangerous message: that international aggression is not 
blameworthy.10 
Some opponents, on the other hand, argue that national security is not 
an area where international law is useful or desirable.11 The risk, they warn, 
is that criminal prosecution will increase political tensions, harden 
positions, and undermine alternative avenues to achieving peace and 
security, such as negotiated solutions.12 Others, concerned for the integrity 
of the Westphalian system of sovereign states, reject the notion of 
individual responsibility in international law altogether.13 
There is little relating to the transnational use of force that is 
uncontroversial. Almost any set of norms or concepts that we might apply 
to these questions could be debated or problematized by philosophic or 
theoretical argument. My purpose in this article is not to engage in that 
normative debate, which I may take up elsewhere, because I see it as a 
potential distraction from the concrete and immediate task of drafting this 
definition. Rather, I want to take as given certain goals and objectives that I 
think are shared by the majority of the participants in this debate and, from 
this basis, to translate these agreed premises into an operationalizable 
process that will generate a definition of aggression that best fits with those 
goals. The premise of the majority of the participants, stated broadly, is that 
an implemented definition will advance the goals of peace and justice set 
out in the preamble to the Rome Statute that established the ICC. 
 
 10. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression, 41 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 281, 290 (2009) (arguing that failing once again to define the crime of aggression will 
effectively provide aggressors a renewed mandate to initiate and wage illegal wars). See also LARRY 
MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 319-41 (2008) (summarizing the broad arguments for 
and against criminal trials for aggression). 
 11. E.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539 (2002) (concluding that 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which limits the use of force in self-defense, has been so frequently 
violated by states that it cannot survive as a guide to United States policy-makers in the war on 
terrorism); Michael J. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A37 
(arguing that repeated transgressions of the prohibition on the use of force have destroyed that maxim 
of international law). See also Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939 
(2005) (using the demise of the prohibition on the use of force to demonstrate his comprehensive theory 
of desuetude); Michael J. Glennon, Terrorism and the Limits of Law, WILSON Q., Spring 2002, at 12 
(noting the pitfalls of strict adherence to abstract legal constructs and the need to balance law and legal 
theory with practical reality). 
 12. Andrew Natsios, “Waltz With Bashir: Why the Arrest Warrant Against Sudan's President Will 
Serve Neither Peace nor Justice,” FOREIGN AFF., Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/64904/andrew-natsios/waltz-with-bashir?page=show (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
 13. The United States has taken this position as one basis for its refusal to become a state party to 
the ICC. Stuart W. Risch, Hostile Outsider of Influential Insider? The United States and the 
International Criminal Court, ARMY LAW., May 2009, at 61, 76. 
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My project, therefore, considers the manner in which those involved 
in drafting the definition of the crime of aggression go about the task of 
conceptualizing the notion. Specifically, I am interested in suggesting 
techniques to aid these drafters in more clearly understanding, specifying, 
and operationalizing their underlying normative and conceptual 
commitments. In so doing, I aim to help the process of drafting the 
definition to converge upon and best fit with, in a clear and rigorous 
fashion, the sociological and geopolitical phenomena that the participants 
hope it will address. 
This research explores the definition of the crime of aggression along 
three dimensions. The first is an exploration of the definition as times 
change and we move from past to future wars. The second dimension 
engages with the challenge of reaching an actual agreement in a context of 
frequently countervailing political and analytic (or academic) demands. 
Here, I am reminded of the joke about the economist who questions her 
colleague’s proposal: “sure, it’ll work in practice, but will it work in 
theory?” The third dimension, which relates closely to the second, is the 
challenge, when conceptualizing aggression, of moving seamlessly from 
the concrete to the abstract and vice versa. This is a perennial challenge in 
law with important implications for this project. 
This article proceeds as follows. It introduces two methodologies that 
are intended to supplement the current negotiation process and thereby help 
correct some of the weaknesses that, I argue, have undermined the 
substantive definition (Part I). One of the methodologies, scenario 
planning, relies upon possible future contingencies to critique the current 
draft. These contingencies are presented in Part II. The article proceeds to 
unearth and explain the constituent concepts that make up the definition, as 
understood by the drafters, and tests them against the proposed 
methodologies (Parts III and IV). The proposed methodologies are not 
determinate (i.e., more than one outcome is possible), so the product of this 
analysis is a critique of the current draft, several suggested forward-looking 
modifications, and an approach to defining the crime of aggression that 
better accommodates conceptual evolution in a context of rapid social 
change. The article closes by evaluating the methodologies and proposing 
avenues for further research. 
International lawmakers are closer to a negotiated definition today 
than at any time since the Nuremberg Charter was penned. The working 
group tasked by the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to define the 
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crime of aggression has produced a breakthrough draft definition.14 The 
final draft article of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression (SWGCA), as this group is called, is reproduced in the 
Appendix. 
I. METHODOLOGIES 
The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression built this 
definition from international legal precedent and customary international 
law, focusing on achieving consensus on the language of the draft. In a 
context where legitimacy is gauged by consensus and cooperation, basing 
an agreement on past agreements proved to be an effective negotiation 
approach, even as it resulted in certain substantive and analytic weaknesses 
in the definition. If adopted by the ASP at the ICC’s first review conference 
in 2010, the definition will empower the Hague-based court to judge and 
punish political and military leaders for planning, preparing, initiating, and 
executing illegal wars. An adopted definition, moreover, will permeate 
national criminal law as ICC member states implement it, activating a 
worldwide network of courts legally bound to hold their own and foreign 
leaders to account. Completing the crime of aggression is the primary task 
of the 2010 review conference. 
A more analytically coherent approach to drafting the crime might 
have been to begin from agreed-upon premises and reason through to their 
definitional implications. This is the primary way that legal scholars and 
philosophers have analyzed the crime of aggression to date. The 
philosopher Michael Walzer, author of the seminal 1970s text on just war 
theory, begins his analysis of the crime of aggression by asking, “what is 
the specific wrong that constitutes aggression?”15 The wrong, Walzer 
reasons, is 
to force people to fight and die in defense of the state that protects their 
common life and the territory on which that common life is lived (it has 
to be lived somewhere). It is not just the crossing of the border that 
 
 14. The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA) is open to all states on 
equal footing, whether or not they have signed and ratified the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, and to a limited number of civil society representatives and legal experts. Mr. Christian 
Wenaweser (Liechtenstein) has chaired the group since 2002 but now that Mr. Wenaweser has been 
elected president of the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties as a whole, Prince Ra’ad Zeid Al-
Hussein of Jordan will lead the drafting project. The SWGCA completed its last formal meeting in New 
York City on February 13, 2009, but will meet informally in the run-up to the review conference to 
consider the elements of the crime and a number of remaining miscellaneous questions. This paper 
analyzes the final product of the working group, the basis for the definition of the crime. 
 15. Michael Walzer, The Crime of Aggressive War, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 635, 635 
(2007). 
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constitutes the wrong but the threat—to the community and its 
members—that the crossing signifies.16 
The philosopher Larry May recently crafted an ambitious normative 
justification for the crime of aggression, perhaps the most coherent to date. 
May, like Walzer, thinks that the mere crossing of a border is not a 
sufficient normative grounding for the crime of aggression. He suggests 
instead, “crimes of aggression are deserving of international prosecution 
when one State undermines the ability of another State to protect human 
rights.”17 From this premise, May refutes the traditional understanding of 
aggression and, more coherently than any before him, justifies his 
alternative. Likewise, Drumbl bases his normative analysis of the crime of 
aggression on four interests that the international community hopes to 
protect by criminalizing aggression: stability, security, human rights, and 
sovereignty.18 Reasoning from these interests, he suggests “an expansion in 
the scope of the crime of aggression, both in terms of the impugned acts as 
well as in terms of who can be prosecuted.”19 Drumbl’s work, like Walzer’s 
and May’s, begins from the normative premises he has selected, but it is 
remarkable for its sensitivity to the realities of the drafters. Walzer’s, 
May’s, and Drumbl’s projects each offer important insights about the crime 
of aggression. Each also requires international lawmakers to agree upon 
shared premises in order to devise a coherent definition. 
The diplomats participating in the drafting project have shied away 
from the prevailing academic approach, represented by these authors, 
presumably because they foresee that it will be more difficult to agree upon 
an explicit normative basis for the definition than upon the wording of the 
definition itself. Instead, they have opted for what the legal scholar Cass 
Sunstein calls an “[i]ncompletely [t]heorized [a]greement.”20 According to 
Sunstein, “when closure cannot be based on relative abstractions, the legal 
system is often able to reach a degree of closure by focusing on relative 
particulars.”21 The particulars in the SWGCA discussions are the very 
words of the draft, which can be negotiated and traded by delegations 
committed to reaching an agreement. Confronted with disagreement on 
fundamental principle, Sunstein posits, participants in the law sometimes 
seek agreement on a result and a relatively low-level explanation for it: 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. MAY, supra note 10, at 3. 
 18. Drumbl, supra note 9, at 306. 
 19. Id. at 294. 
 20. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1733, 1733 (1995). 
 21. Id. at 1737. 
COPY OF WEISBORD_FMT3.NOV18.DOC 11/20/2009  12:53:44 PM 
2009] CONCEPTUALIZING AGGRESSION 7 
“When they disagree on an abstraction, they move to a level of greater 
particularity.”22 However, even an incompletely theorized agreement has a 
normative basis, and the diplomats drafting the definition of the crime of 
aggression found theirs, at least explicitly, by looking back to legal 
precedent and customary international law. Implicitly, each delegation’s 
choice of precedents, and the way that delegation sought to incorporate 
them into the draft definition reflected, at least in part, its particular 
interests and ideals. 
While the backward-looking method employed by the diplomats as 
they negotiated the definition of the crime succeeded in bringing the 
delegations to the brink of an agreement, it also carried with it a number of 
weaknesses, weaknesses that are not unique to these negotiations. These 
weaknesses map onto the three previously mentioned dimensions of this 
article. The first is that, as a direct consequence of the method chosen by 
the diplomats, the definition of the crime of aggression contains 
anachronistic concepts that undermine its relevance, and therefore its 
legitimacy, today. The broader question here is how law grounded in the 
past can best speak to the future. Second, by building the definition from a 
hodgepodge of past agreements, the diplomats made analytic and 
normative coherence a secondary concern. The method may have 
succeeded in practice in building agreement, but is this agreement 
defensible as a theory? Third, the method has obscured the political and 
strategic interests of states in the language of law, making these interests 
more difficult to discern and balance. Finally, the incompletely theorized 
draft definition was built from precedent and custom that sometimes risks, 
in its generality, violating the principle of legality.23 The tension between 
the abstract and the concrete that pervades all lawmaking is particularly 
acute in the field of criminal law, where individual liberty is directly at 
stake. Meanwhile, as Sunstein demonstrates in Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements, the move from the abstract to the particular and vice versa can 
be a powerful technique to manage negotiation deadlock and converge 
upon an agreement. 
My position, in its most general terms, is that the legitimacy of the 
definition of a crime can be built—and squandered—in various ways. This 
article argues that the definition of the crime of aggression should be 
 
 22. Id. at 1736. 
 23. The definition of a crime must be specific enough to forewarn potential perpetrators of the 
distinction between permissible and prohibited behavior. Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute states, in 
relevant part, that “[i]n case of ambiguity, the definition [of a crime] shall be interpreted in favour [sic] 
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 22(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 104. 
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forward- as well as backward-looking. A backward-looking definition that 
fails to regulate important forms of aggression as they emerge is fated to 
become irrelevant. A definition that does not fit the sociological 
phenomenon it seeks to regulate is, and will be perceived to be, unjust. 
These may not seem like controversial claims but, as this article 
demonstrates, they have transformative implications for the substantive 
definition of the crime of aggression. Traces of a sociologically sensitive 
and forward-looking approach are already present in the negotiations and 
this article seeks to build upon and systematize them. My solution does not 
resolve the tensions between past commitments and future contingencies, 
certainty and flexibility, and the possible and the desirable, but it 
represents, in my mind, a realistic improvement upon the current approach. 
In order to imagine a forward-looking concept of aggression, this 
article brings insights from two social science methodologies into the 
predominantly doctrinal discussion. These methodological approaches are 
scenario planning24 and the grounded theory methodology of Glaser and 
Strauss.25 The substantive contribution of this article is to identify outdated 
concepts in the emerging definition and to consider incremental 
modifications and interpretations that are more sociologically relevant. The 
methodological contribution of this article is to begin to flesh out a nascent 
approach in international lawmaking that is both forward-looking and 
sociologically sensitive based on the amalgamation of these two methods. 
A. Scenario Planning 
Scenario planning is a set of methods for “improving the quality of 
educated guesses” about the future.26 There are many examples of 
governments and businesses using scenario planning to help decision-
makers imagine, anticipate, and prepare for a range of possible futures. 
Since 1950, the National Intelligence Council of the Central Intelligence 
Agency has produced intelligence estimates that set out alternative future 
scenarios and are relied upon by United States policy-makers as they plan 
 
 24. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE BATTLE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2008) [hereinafter BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT]; PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF 
ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002) [hereinafter BOBBITT, SHIELD OF 
ACHILLES]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004); ROYAL DUTCH SHELL GROUP, THE 
SHELL GLOBAL SCENARIOS TO 2025: THE FUTURE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT: TRENDS, TRADE-OFFS 
AND CHOICES (2005) [hereinafter SHELL GLOBAL SCENARIOS]. 
 25. BARNY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY: 
STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967). 
 26. GILL RINGLAND, SCENARIO PLANNING 11 (1998). 
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for the future.27 The Royal Dutch Shell Company used scenario planning as 
early as the 1970s to anticipate the rapid fluctuations in oil prices brought 
on by the formation and actions of OPEC and, in the 1980s, to envisage the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.28 The Levi-Strauss clothing company uses a 
scenario planning methodology to consider what would happen, for 
instance, if cotton no longer existed or the cotton industry was 
deregulated.29 The scenario planning methodology can also be a valuable 
analytic tool for the SWGCA as it drafts a definition meant to regulate 
future wars. 
The range of practices that make up the scenario planning 
methodology are best described in contrast to a related future studies 
methodology: forecasting.30 A scenario can be defined as “an internally 
consistent view of what the future might turn out to be”—not a forecast, 
but one possible future outcome.31 According to English future studies 
scholars George Wright and Paul Goodwin, “[t]he forecaster looks for a 
model of reality containing the necessary and sufficient conditions to pin 
down the future, the scenario thinker is satisfied to work with only 
necessary conditions, and is happy to explore the multiple possibilities 
these lead to.”32 Joseph Nye, former head of the United States National 
Intelligence Council, describes scenario planning as a tool in estimative 
intelligence “[t]o help policymakers interpret the available facts, to suggest 
alternative patterns that available facts might fit, [and] to provide informed 
assessments of the range and likelihood of possible outcomes.”33 
Scenario planners use an array of methods to imagine and refine 
possible futures. An example of an influential procedural tool used by 
scenario planners is the Delphi technique, developed by the RAND 
Corporation in the 1950s, a corporation originally established to research 
new weapons technology.34 Researchers employing the Delphi technique 
 
 27. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Peering into the Future, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 82, 83 (1994). 
 28. See RINGLAND, supra note 26, at 20-21; see also BOBBITT, SHIELD OF ACHILLES, supra note 
24, at 718-19. 
 29. RINGLAND, supra note 26, at 30. For more in depth case studies of how scenario planning has 
been used and by whom, see id. at 259. 
 30. See MICHAEL GODET, CREATING FUTURES: SCENARIO PLANNING AS A STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT TOOL 2 (2d ed. 2006) (“Future studies, or foresight as la prospective is usually 
translated, involves anticipation (pre- or pro-activity) to clarify present actions in light of possible or 
desirable futures.”). 
 31. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR 
PERFORMANCE 446 (1985). 
 32. Kees van der Heijden, Scenario Planning: Scaffolding Disorganized Ideas About the Future, 
in FORECASTING WITH JUDGMENT 39, 50 (George Wright & Paul Goodwin eds., 1998). 
 33. Nye, supra note 27, at 83. 
 34. The key innovators were Olaf Helmer, Norman Dalkey, and Nicholas Rescher. 
COPY OF WEISBORD_FMT3.NOV18.DOC 11/20/2009  12:53:44 PM 
10 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:1 
ask individual experts to answer successive questionnaires about the future 
and provide their reasoning. Between rounds of questionnaires, the 
researchers summarize the answers and reasons of the experts in a single 
document and give the summary back to the experts to consider. The 
experts are encouraged to revise their answers between rounds and the 
expectation is that they will eventually converge on the best estimates.35 
Shell and the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) rely heavily on methods 
from the Pierre Wack Intuitive Logics School, which emphasizes the 
creation of “a coherent and credible set of stories of the future as a ‘wind 
tunnel’ for testing business plans or projects.”36 Scenario planning methods 
may be complex or simple. 
In this paper, a simple scenario planning method will be used that 
draws on the forecasts of experts on war, leadership, and organizations as a 
wind tunnel to test the viability of the emerging SWGCA definition of 
aggression. War is changing and the SWGCA has not adequately accounted 
for this fact. Part II of this paper sets out key trajectories that are likely to 
continue into the foreseeable future. A basic grounded theory methodology, 
described in the next section, will be employed as a basis for modifying 
existing concepts or developing new ones that better fit the range of 
possible futures. Application of scenario planning to the field of law will 
also be used as a way to test the possibilities and limitations of the scenario 
planning method. 
B. Grounded Theory 
The grounded theory methodology of Barney Glaser and Anselm 
Strauss is a response to the logico-deductive method of theory generation in 
social research whereby concepts and their relation are devised from a 
priori assumptions via armchair speculation.37 Glaser and Strauss felt that 
these “armchair” theories did not optimally fit the facts or work. By fit, 
they meant, “that the categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to 
and indicated by the data under study.”38 By work, they meant that “[the 
categories] must be meaningfully relevant to and be able to explain the 
behavior under study.”39 Glaser and Strauss charged many “great men” 
theories in social research—the theories of Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and 
Marx, among others—with this defect, which they believed had 
 
 35. RINGLAND, supra note 26, at 19. See also Gene Rowe & George Wright, The Delphi 
Technique as a Forecasting Tool: Issues and Analysis, 15 INT’L J. FORECASTING 351 (1999). 
 36. RINGLAND, supra note 26, at 27. 
 37. GLASER & STRAUSS, supra note 25, at viii, 31. 
 38. Id. at 3. 
 39. Id. 
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undermined the field of sociology by turning it into a mere repository of 
great men theories with students relegated to technicians testing these 
theories in small ways rather than devising their own.40 In order to put the 
field of sociology back on track, Glaser and Strauss proposed a method for 
generating “grounded theory,” whereby concepts are systematically 
generated, tested, and modified from and against new social science data.41 
Their approach, created in the 1960s as they studied how nurses care for 
dying patients, became one of the most widely used qualitative methods in 
social research. The qualitative methods of Glaser and Strauss, in spite of 
their internalization in other areas of social research, have not yet 
penetrated the field of law. 
Strauss and Corbin define theory as “a set of well-developed 
categories that are systematically interrelated through statements of 
relationship to form a theoretical framework that explains some social 
phenomenon.”42 Glaser and Strauss describe the elements of a theory as 
“first, conceptual categories and their conceptual properties; and second, 
hypotheses or generalized relations among the categories and their 
properties.”43 “A category stands by itself as a conceptual element of a 
theory. A property, in turn, is a conceptual aspect or element of a 
category.”44 The basis of Glaser and Strauss’s grounded theory 
methodology is that theory generation is a process and that a theory is “an 
ever-developing entity,” never a “perfected product” frozen in time.45 In 
this way, grounded theory generation is similar to the common law: both 
systems continually test conceptual formulations against new contingencies 
and modify these formulations to fit the facts. 
The process of grounded theory generation relies on an inductive-
deductive loop which Glaser and Strauss call “the constant comparative 
method of qualitative analysis.”46 Rather than devising categories, 
properties and their relations from a priori assumptions, grounded theory 
generation begins from the data related to a research situation—the 
treatment of dying patients, social stigma, or the use of military force, for 
example. Within the research situation, 
 
 40. Id. at 10. 
 41. Glaser and Strauss devised their method of theory generation from systematically obtained 
data in the 1960s while studying how nurses care for dying patients. See generally BARNEY G. GLASER 
AND ANSELM L. STRAUSS, AWARENESS OF DYING (1965). 
 42. ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED 
THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 22 (2d ed. 1998). 
 43. GLASER & STRAUSS, supra note 25, at 35. 
 44. Id. at 36. 
 45. Id. at 32. 
 46. Id. at 101. 
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[t]he constant comparing of many groups draws the sociologist’s 
attention to their many similarities and differences. Considering these 
leads him to generate abstract categories and their properties, which, 
since they emerge from the data, will clearly be important to a theory 
explaining the kind of behavior under observation.47 
These emergent categories are compared with new data and modified 
to best explain the behavior under observation. The newly refined 
categories serve to guide the theorist’s data collection efforts by 
influencing his or her theoretical sampling.48 According to Glaser and 
Strauss, “[l]ower level categories emerge rather quickly during the early 
phases of data collection,” while “[h]igher level, overriding and integrating, 
conceptualizations—and the properties that elaborate them—tend to come 
later during the joint collection, coding and analysis of the data.”49 An 
important point about grounded theory for the current definitional project is 
that new data need not incessantly expand a nascent theory. Rather, new 
data refines or changes that theory so that it better fits and works. 
The process of regulating human social interactions through law, 
lawmaking, is both similar and different from the process of social theory 
generation, theorizing. The principal difference between lawmaking and 
theorizing is that, while social theorists deal with what is (explanation, 
prediction, and control), those regulating social interaction through law 
have the added responsibility of incorporating an ought—or prescriptive—
element into their constructs. However, the ought element of a law is only 
intelligible in relation to the social theory upon which it rests. This social 
theory as an element of a law is assembled from concepts and their 
relations, and is intended to reflect reality as authentically as possible—in 
the words of Glaser and Strauss, to fit and to work. In particular, a rule 
regulating human social interactions, like a social theory, must be 
assembled from concepts that fit the facts and relate in a true-to-life way. A 
rule that requires individuals or groups to behave in unrealistic ways is 
experienced as unjust. Therefore, a legal rule can be thought of as a social 
theory—conceptual categories, conceptual properties, and generalized 
relations among the categories and their properties—that includes a 
prescription. This understanding of the character of rules invites legal 
scholars to bring methodological insights from social theorists, such as 
Glaser and Strauss, into the field of law. 
 
 47. Id. at 36. 
 48. Id. at 45 (“Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory 
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next 
and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges.”). 
 49. Id. at 36. 
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The following parts of this paper test this understanding of rules as 
social theories with an ought element by applying aspects of Glaser and 
Strauss’s grounded theory methodology to the emerging definition of the 
crime of aggression. The focus is the social theory element. In particular, 
the grounded theory methodology will be the engine used to generate 
conceptual categories, properties, and their relations from new data on the 
character of armed conflict under possible futures. It is in this way that 
scenario planning and grounded theory methodologies will be applied in 
conjunction. Scenario planning will supply the data, and grounded theory 
will provide the analytic approach to organize this data. Within the 
lawmaking process, the contours of the rule will adhere to the agreement 
the negotiators are able to reach on its concepts, properties, and relations. 
Beyond generating forward-looking conceptual categories (and properties 
and relations) that can serve as constituent elements of the crime of 
aggression, this article will begin to evaluate the possibilities and 
limitations of the grounded theory approach in the field of law. 
Part II identifies key political-military patterns in the armed conflicts 
that occurred between 1989 and the present and extrapolates to future 
scenarios. In subsequent parts of this article, these scenarios are used, in 
conjunction with grounded theory methodology, as a wind tunnel to test 
and refine the conceptual categories, properties, and relations of the 
SWGCA definition of aggression. This is not, as mentioned before, a 
determinate method that generates a fixed outcome. Rather, the following 
analysis demonstrates a process designed to bring better clarity than what 
currently exists about the kinds of phenomena that the drafters seek to 
include in the definition. As I hope to show, the results of this process are 
both interesting and novel. 
II. FUTURE AGGRESSION SCENARIOS 
War is changing. Independent groups other than the state are 
increasingly its perpetrators. These groups seem to be moving away from 
the bureaucratic organizational form and towards more strategic 
organizational arrangements. They are supplementing armed force with 
new unarmed methods that are ever more destructive to life and property. 
States drafting and voting on the definition of the crime of aggression 
should have the opportunity to consider whether to reflect these changes in 
the core concepts that make up the definition of the crime. In order to 
encourage this discussion, this part sets out and extrapolates from three 
emerging scenarios: first, war will become less state-centric and more 
decentralized; second, war-making organizations will restructure; and third, 
the methods of warfare will change so that they can no longer be justifiably 
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limited conceptually to the use of armed force. The following section 
constitutes the thick description upon which my suggested modifications to 
and interpretations of the draft definition of aggression will be based.50 
A. War is becoming less state-centric and more decentralized 
In a seminal article in the Marine Corps Gazette, a team of American 
analysts led by William S. Lind set out a generational theory that describes 
warfare as heading towards an increasingly decentralized form and 
resulting in the nation state’s loss of its monopoly on combat forces.51 Lind 
and his team, writing as the Soviet Union was collapsing, believed that they 
were entering a new generation of warfare, which they called the Fourth 
Generation. “A premise of 4GW,” according to a 2007 posting on In 
Defense and the National Interest, “is that the world itself has changed, so 
that terrorism and guerilla warfare—and other elusive techniques that are 
still being invented—are now ready to move to center stage.”52 
The heralds of Fourth Generation warfare are not alone in their 
forecasts. Military historian Martin van Creveld53 and United States 
counterterrorism expert John Robb54 describe the diminishing importance 
of conventional war and forecast the future irrelevance of state-on-state 
warfare. According to Robb, “Wars between states are now, for all intents 
and purposes, obsolete.”55 Robb predicts that “[t]he real threat, as seen in 
the rapid rise in global terrorism over the past five years, is that this threat 
isn’t another state but rather the superempowered group . . . and as the 
leverage provided by technology increases, this threshold will finally reach 
its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare war on the world 
 
 50. If the suggested methodology were used in the context of a multilateral international 
negotiation, the participants would propose scenarios to be regulated and make these an integral part of 
their discussion. Scenarios generating widespread support would serve as the initial basis of the 
definition. This has already been done, if only occasionally, in the negotiations of the SWGCA. 
 51. William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale, Captain John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W. 
Sutton, & Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, 
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Oct. 1989, at 22. The first generation was characterized by tactics of line and 
column and culminated in the massed-manpower armies of the Napoleonic era. The second generation 
used the industrial society to mass-produce firepower and encourage tactics such as indirect fire 
covering movement. In the third generation, rather than closing with the enemy, successful commanders 
used mechanized forces to bypass and collapse the enemy’s formations (i.e., blitzkrieg). See also 
THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY 16-31 (2004). 
 52. Defense and the National Interest, Is 4GW Simply Using Military Force in New Ways? (Nov. 
25, 2007), http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/strategy-and-force-employment/fourth-generation-warfare-articles/. 
 53. See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 10-18 (1991). 
 54. JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR: THE NEXT STATE OF TERRORISM AND THE END OF 
GLOBALIZATION 7 (2007). 
 55. Id. 
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and win.”56 In 2007, T.X. Hammes, a retired colonel in the United States 
Marine Corps, corroborated Robb’s findings: “there have been major 
changes in who fights wars. The trend has been and continues to be 
downward from nation-states using huge, uniformed armies to small groups 
of like-minded people with no formal organization who simply choose to 
fight.”57 That same year, a Marine Corps seminar produced a draft doctrinal 
manual, in which the authors warned that, “[o]ften, Fourth Generation 
opponents’ strategic centers of gravity are intangible.”58 Unlike Robb, who 
argues that conventional war is obsolete, the authors of the draft manual 
add, “[l]ike always, the old generations of war continue to exist even as 
new ones evolve.”59 
Philip Bobbitt’s analysis agrees with Robb and the Marine Corps 
seminar that war is changing and that “asymmetric warfare will become the 
norm when great powers are confronted.”60 However, Bobbitt forecasts that 
the state will remain the center of gravity in geopolitics: “[t]he State has 
undergone many transformations in the constitutional order—the basis for 
the state’s legitimacy—in the ensuing five centuries. Now it is about to 
undergo another.”61 Bobbitt asks, “[c]ould al Qaeda be an example of this 
new form?”62 Bobbitt’s dynamic conception of the state may offer 
diplomats drafting the definition of the crime and jurists interpreting it a 
way to include acts by al Qaeda-like groups within its ambit. 
Despite their different perspectives on the future of the state, these 
forecasters point in a similar direction—most fundamentally, towards the 
decentralization of armed conflict—that few experts today dispute.63 If 
accurate, the literature on the transformation of war has important 
repercussions on the way aggression should be conceptualized and 
regulated. Meanwhile, the current methods used by the diplomats as they 
negotiate the definition of aggression, which rely on international legal 
precedent and customary international law, are incapable of capturing these 
 
 56. Id. at 7-8. 
 57. T.X. Hammes, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges, MIL. REV., May-June 
2007, at 14, 20. 
 58. Imperial and Royal (K.u. K.) Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps, Fourth Generation War, 
FMFM 1-A, Draft 4.2, (June 18, 2007) at 6, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/3007/fmfm_1-
a.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Marine Seminar]. 
 59. Id. at 20. 
 60. BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT, supra note 24, at 146. 
 61. Id. at 126. 
 62. Id. 
 63. But see J. ECHEVARRIA II, STRAT. STUD. INST., FOURTH GENERATION WAR AND OTHER 
MYTHS (2005), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pub 
ID=632 (providing a dissenting view). 
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changes. Part III of this paper will analyze the concept of the 
state/collective act of aggression emerging from the SWGCA and evaluate 
it in light of the literature on the transformation of war. 
B. War-making organizations are restructuring 
Bureaucracy is increasingly limited as an organizational model for 
strategic warfare. This shift away from bureaucracy is predominantly a 
reaction to three problems faced by this organizational form: wasted 
intelligence, failure to control the formal-informal split within the 
organization, and the inability to adapt efficiently when organizational 
change is required.64 In the context of modern warfare, bureaucracies 
present two additional problems. First, they are an easy target. It is less 
complex to attack a government, which has permanent institutions and 
infrastructure, than the hundreds of mercurial cells that make up al Qaeda. 
Second, though bureaucracies are effective at coordinating massive uses of 
force, they are not particularly resilient as an organizational form. 
Specialization of function increases productive output, but it also makes the 
entire system vulnerable when a single part is disabled. In response to these 
weaknesses, war-making organizations are restructuring. 
Rutgers management professor Charles Heckscher forecasts that 
organizations in general are undergoing a long-term shift that amounts to 
an evolutionary development beyond bureaucracy.65 Heckscher and 
Donnellon et al. describe a pattern of empirical developments that 
characterize the “post-bureaucratic” organization,66 including increased 
member participation in decision-making, cross-functional teams breaking 
the walls of functional organizations, parallel organizations operating on 
the basis of multi-level consensus, information technology facilitating 
dense networks of communication, organizational development practices 
building the decision-making capacity of peer groups, opening of 
previously closed inter-organizational boundaries, sharing of information 
 
 64. Charles Heckscher, Defining the Post-Bureaucratic Type, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC 
ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 14, 20-24 (Charles Heckscher & 
Anne Donnellon eds., 1994). 
 65. Id. at 14. 
 66. “[A]n organic form of organization . . . [is] more team-based, more flexible, and less rule-
bound than the traditional ‘mechanical’ hierarchy.” Charles Heckscher & Lynda M. Applegate, 
Introduction, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE 2 (Charles Heckscher & Anne Donnellon eds. 1994). See also 12 Manage, Adjusting 
Organization Forms to Appropriate Conditions: Explanation of Theory of Organic and Mechanistic 
Organizations of Burns and Stalker, http://www.12manage.com/methods_burns_mechanistic_ 
organic_systems.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) (comparing the post-bureaucratic and the organic 
organizational forms). 
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previously reserved for top officials, negotiated over top-down solutions, 
and new roles such as task force leader, change agent, coordinator, 
boundary-basher.67 A key characteristic of this shift is that the “post-
bureaucratic organization” relies on the use of influence rather than 
power.68 “The influence hierarchy is not embedded in permanent offices,” 
observes Heckscher, “and is to a far greater degree than bureaucracy based 
on the consent of and the perceptions of other members of the 
organization.”69 The central role of influence rather than formal authority in 
post-bureaucratic organizations has important implications for the 
definition of the crime of aggression that will be set out in Part IV of this 
paper. 
These post-bureaucratic developments correspond to a change in the 
concept of leadership so that formal position and effective control over the 
action of subordinates, the key criteria in international criminal law, are no 
longer the most relevant properties of the category. What is becoming 
increasingly relevant to the concept of leadership is, rather, an individual’s 
centrality within a social network and his or her influence upon that 
network or group. According to Professors Daniel Brass and Marlene 
Burkhardt, specialists in organizational behavior, “a common finding in 
social network studies is that central positions are often associated with 
power and influence.”70 Centrality is most often defined in terms of degree 
(“the number of direct ties one has with others”),71 betweenness (“falls on 
the shortest path between pairs of other points”),72 and closeness 
(“distances among points”)73 within a social network. Influence, according 
to Professor Joseph Nye, rests on the combination of hard power (carrots 
and sticks) and soft power (attraction and cooption).74 This article will 
 
 67. Charles Heckscher & Lynda M. Applegate, Introduction, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC 
ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 2-3 (Charles Heckscher & Anne 
Donnellon eds. 1994). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Daniel J. Brass & Marlene E. Burkhardt, Centrality and Power in Organizations, in 
NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS 191, 191 (Nitin Nohria & Robert G. Eccles eds., 1992). 
 71. Michael D. Irwing & Holly L. Hughes, Centrality and the Structure of the Urban Interaction: 
Measures, Concepts, and Applications, 71 SOC. FORCES 17, 19 (1992). 
 72. Linton C. Freeman, A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness, 40 SOCIOMETRY 
35, 35 (1977) (citing Alex Bavelas, A Mathematical Model for Group Structure, 7 APPLIED 
ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 16 (1948)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE POWERS TO LEAD 31 (2008) (“Soft power is not merely the same as 
influence, though it is one source of influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of 
threats or payments. Nor is soft power just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, 
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consider whether the SWGCA definition of aggression can reach beyond 
formal authority to capture both aspects of influence, which have been 
operationalized in numerous studies and would not be difficult to employ 
for the purpose of criminal law by the ASP or the Court.75 
C. The methods of warfare are changing 
The use of armed force may still be the primary method of warfare, 
but this is changing. Invasion, bombardment, blockade, and the sending or 
directing of proxy forces into an enemy state are the methods of warfare 
that form the basis of the SWGCA concept of aggression. These traditional 
methods are increasingly being supplemented by a cluster of destructive 
methods, called “systems disruption,” that do not rely on arms.76 
John Robb, the former United States counterterrorism operation 
planner and commander who coined the term, describes systems disruption 
as the sabotage of critical systems such as electricity, telecommunications, 
gas, water, or transport, to inflict economic costs on a target state.77 Though 
sabotage is an ancient form of warfare, Robb predicts that it will soon take 
center stage because of our increased reliance on interdependent 
networks.78 By targeting a vulnerable point in a network and disrupting it 
by whatever means, armed or unarmed, an aggressor can collapse a system, 
“amplif[ying] the damage of the attack and providing rates of return up to a 
million times the initial investment (the cost of the attack)”:79 
In the summer of 2004, Iraq’s global guerillas attacked a southern 
section of the Iraqi oil pipeline infrastructure (Iraq has over 4300 miles 
of pipelines). This attack cost the attackers an estimated $2000 to 
produce. None of the attackers was caught. The effects of this attack 
were over $500 million in lost oil exports.80 
Systems disruption makes warfare affordable to small groups and even 
individuals intelligent enough to find a system’s unique vulnerabilities and 
create a cascade of failure.81 Robb gives numerous examples of massively 
damaging systems disruption attacks of which the 2006 attacks on two 
 
though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to entice and attract. Attraction often leads to 
acquiescence.”). 
 75. Linton C. Freeman, Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification, 1 SOC. 
NETWORKS 215 (1979). 
 76. ROBB, supra note 54, at 95. 
 77. Id. at 95. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 98. 
 80. Id. at 99. 
 81. Id. at 100. 
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Russian Gazprom pipelines carrying natural gas to Georgia is one.82 In the 
midst of harshly cold weather, Gazprom’s primary and backup pipelines 
were destroyed at the same time as a power transmission pylon carrying 
electricity from Russia to Georgia. The attacks reduced Georgia to a 
“preindustrial level” for a week.83 Two features of systems disruption 
attacks are particularly important for drafters and interpreters of the crime 
of aggression to take into account: first, the low cost and high return of 
these attacks allows individuals and small groups other than the state to 
wage war; second, these attacks need not be carried out with armaments. 
Cyberwarfare, a method still in its infancy, seems poised to become an 
important method for aggressive states, small groups, and individuals to 
disrupt an enemy’s essential infrastructure (or services) and cause massive 
damage. Essential infrastructure and services such as air traffic control, 
medical files, and defense systems increasingly rely on networks to operate 
and are vulnerable to attack from inside or out. To date, documented 
cyberattacks have amounted to a growing nuisance rather than causing 
significant damage to infrastructure,84 but recent attacks hint at vastly 
destructive future scenarios. Volunteer groups tracking malicious activity 
on the internet documented attacks against Georgia as early as July 20, 
2008, weeks before the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali or the Russian 
invasion.85 Government, media, communications and transportations 
companies were attacked. The website of Georgian president Mikheil 
Saakashvili was overwhelmed by a “denial of service attack” whereby a 
barrage of millions of bogus requests overloaded and shut it down. 86 The 
web sites of the Georgian parliament and the National Bank of Georgia 
were defaced by images of twentieth century dictators interspersed with 
images of President Saakashvili. The attacks in Georgia targeted websites, 
but, in 2007, cyberattacks in Estonia briefly interrupted communication 
with Emergency services.87 Hackers who disrupt government web sites 
today may disrupt or mimic government and military electronic 
communications tomorrow, turning institutions and infrastructure against 
an enemy at low cost and with minimal risk to their own safety. If 
cyberwarfare is wedded to advanced notions of systems disruption, the next 
 
 82. Id. at 94-95. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Ethan Zuckerman, Misunderstanding Cyberwar in Georgia, REUTERS, Aug. 16, 2008, http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSGOR66065320080816. 
 85. John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Marching off to Cyberwar, ECONOMIST TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY, Dec. 6, 2008, at 13, 
available at http://www.economist.com/sciencetechnology/tq/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12673385. 
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oil pipeline, electricity grid, or nuclear reactor to be sabotaged may be 
struck by a hacker, not a bomb. 
A key aspect of cyberwar for the concept of aggression is the 
disaggregated quality of the attacks. In April 2001, a United States Navy 
spy plane collided with a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea, 
killed the fighter’s pilot, and was forced to land on China’s Hainan Island. 
After a diplomatic row, the plane and crew were returned safely to the 
United States. Following the incident, un-attributable web sites sprang up 
offering instructions to hackers on how to disable United States 
government computers.88 According to United States officials, the attacks 
nearly shut down California’s electrical grid.89 To this day, nobody knows 
whether the attacks were state-sponsored or grass-roots activism.90 As 
private companies such as the Russian Business Network91 disseminate 
more malicious software capable of turning private computers from 
Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe into unknowing bases from which cyberattacks 
can be waged, the source of the ensuing attacks will become still more 
murky and responsibility maddeningly difficult to attribute to a state. In 
this context, bureaucracy, the paradigmatic organizational model imagined 
by the drafters of the crime of aggression as they designed the legal 
mechanism whereby responsibility will be attributed to an individual, is 
less relevant. 
The following parts of this article will test the constituent concepts of 
the SWGCA definition of the crime of aggression against these scenarios—
war is becoming less state-centric, war-making organizations are 
reorganizing, the methods of warfare are changing—and suggest forward-
looking modifications and interpretations. My intention is to shift the 
discussion to future contingencies. The constituent parts of the definition of 
the crime of aggression, as understood by the drafters, structure the 
analysis. They are the state/collective act of aggression and the conceptual 
link through which an individual is held accountable for that 
state/collective act.92 
 
 88. Michael Reilly, How Long Before All-out Cyberwar?, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 23, 2008, at 24. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Markoff, supra note 85. 
 92. The jurisdictional trigger that allows the ICC or a member state to initiate an aggression case 
is part of the SWGCA negotiations. E.g., ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, 6th Sess., New York, June 6, 2008, Report of the Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, Annex II, 6-8, ICC-ASP/6/20/Add.1, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-6-20-Add1-AnnexII-ENG.pdf.; Preparatory Commission 
for the International Criminal Court, New York, July 25, 2002, Report of the Preparatory Commission 
for the International Criminal Court: Addendum Part II: Proposals for a Provision on the Crime of 
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III. CONCEPTUALIZING THE STATE/COLLECTIVE ACT OF 
AGGRESSION 
The SWGCA has proposed a historic solution to the ancient problem 
of how to distinguish just from unjust wars.93 The solution was negotiated 
in the context of a Cold War era General Assembly Resolution (3314) 
called “Definition of Aggression,” a resolution that delegates have chosen, 
because of its precedential value, to use as the basis for the state/collective 
component of the definition of the crime.94 The SWGCA selected articles 
from the 1974 Definition, which pertains to states, and incorporated them 
into the definition of the crime of aggression, which pertains to individuals. 
The incorporated articles from the 1974 Definition are now part of the draft 
definition of the crime of aggression, known in the SWGCA as the State 
Act of Aggression or simply the State Act. 
As a result of the SWGCA’s drafting method, fundamental sub-issues 
within the ancient debate over just and unjust wars such as the subject of 
the prohibition, the distinction between aggression and self-defense, and 
the acts that qualify as aggression are all subsumed in the formal legal 
debate over the correct way to incorporate this 1974 resolution into the 
larger crime. In order to understand the concept of aggression that 
materializes when parts of that definition are incorporated into the draft 
definition of the crime of aggression and others are left out, it is therefore 
necessary to understand the provisions of the 1974 Definition and their 
relationship to each other. Part III undertakes this analysis and tests the 
resulting concept of aggression that the SWGCA has employed in the 
 
Aggression, 3-4, PCNICC/2002/2/ADD.2, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ 
pcnicc2002_2e.pdf. The jurisdictional trigger is not, however, considered a part of the definition of the 
crime of aggression. 
 93. For examples of this literature, see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL 
ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR 
TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY (1981); JAMES TURNER 
JOHNSON, THE HOLY WAR IDEA IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS (1997); JAMES TURNER 
JOHNSON, MORALITY & CONTEMPORARY WARFARE (1999); TERRY NARDIN ET AL., TRADITIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992); James F. Childress, Just-War 
Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of Their Criteria, 39 THEOLOGICAL 
STUDIES 427 (1978); James F. Childress, Moral Discourses About War in the Early Church, in PEACE, 
POLITICS AND THE PEOPLE OF GOD 117-34 (Paul Peachy ed., 1986); Sohail H. Hashmi, Interpreting the 
Islamic Ethic of War and Peace, in THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 
PERSPECTIVES 146-68 (Terry Nardin ed., 1996); MOHAMMAD TAGHI KAROUBI, JUST OR UNJUST WAR? 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNILATERAL USE OF ARMED FORCE BY STATES AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH 
CENTURY (2004). 
 94. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter 1974 
Resolution]. The term state/collective is used throughout this article to indicate that the collective 
responsible for an act of aggression need not be a state. 
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definition of the crime against the future aggression scenarios set out in 
Part II. 
It turns out that the 1974 Definition, as it has been incorporated into 
the draft definition of the crime, is riddled with anachronistic concepts that 
undermine its normative relevance today. This is not surprising. The 1974 
Definition is a product of Cold War ideas and politics. The armed conflicts 
at the time of the negotiations—between 1950 and 1974—shaped the 
discussions of the delegates and the concept of aggression that emerged. 
The delegates attempted to regulate the dominant forms of armed conflict 
occurring around them, as well as to ensure that the definition advanced 
their key political-strategic interests. Interestingly, the scenario planning 
method was more apparent in these Cold War-era negotiations than it is in 
the current drafting project. During the Cold War, the competing blocs 
quite explicitly sought to forecast how each proposal might, under possible 
futures, impact their political and strategic interests. 
Three characteristics of the armed conflicts of the day shaped the 1974 
Definition: the political-strategic competition between the Soviet Union 
and the West for global supremacy; the forms of armed conflict that the 
delegates sought to regulate, specifically, nuclear war, conventional war for 
territory, and state-sponsored insurgency; and struggles of peoples for 
independence from colonial regimes. The negotiations became a Cold War 
battlefield with words as weapons, arguments as tactics, and the definition 
of aggression a strategic asset that states vied to control with the aim of one 
day mobilizing it against their geopolitical rivals. The dominant forms of 
armed conflict today and in the foreseeable future, however, are different 
now than they were in 1974, as are the strategic interests shaping the 
definition of the crime of aggression. 
Furthermore, the negotiating positions of delegates and the positions 
of legal scholars commenting on the definition, such as Benjamin Ferencz 
and Julius Stone, were conditioned by their understanding of the 
possibilities and limitations of law, and international law in particular. 
Specifically, the negotiations over the Definition of Aggression were taking 
place as the field of international law was undergoing an historic 
transformation.95 According to Harvard Law Professor David Kennedy, 
“[a]ll of pre-war international law was in disrepute after 1945. The 
positivists in the United States had been largely isolationist, and the 
naturalist enthusiasts for the League seemed to have been altogether out of 
 
 95. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 335, 380 (2000). 
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touch . . . .”96 The new disciplinary consensus, which was to last until the 
end of the Cold War, “rejected both naturalism and positivism in favor of a 
general sensibility influenced by pragmatism, functionalism, American 
legal realism, and the American legal process school.”97 Just as the post-
World War II political landscape shaped the 1974 Definition of 
Aggression, the post-World War II intellectual sensibility left its mark. 
This conceptual analysis of the state/collective act of aggression as a 
component of the crime of aggression will focus on four key properties 
(also the sub-Parts of Part III): A) the unit to be regulated; B) the primary 
feature distinguishing aggression and self-defense; C) the acts that qualify 
as aggression; and D) the Escheresque property of the 1974 Definition, lost 
in the definition of the crime of aggression. It is this final characteristic of 
the 1974 Definition, its Escheresque property, that makes any modification 
of it for the purpose of incorporating it into the definition of the crime of 
aggression so delicate. 
In particular, as the 1974 Definition was being negotiated, 
discrepancies between American and Soviet concepts of aggression were 
managed using a drafting technique that can be characterized as 
Escheresque because of its analogy to the trompe-l’oeil sketches of the 
Dutch artist M.C. Escher. Just as removing one element from an Escher 
sketch can fundamentally change its character, removing articles from the 
1974 Definition fundamentally alter the concept of aggression. This is why 
each sub-Part of the following analysis begins by tracing how the SWGCA 
incorporation of the 1974 Definition into the definition of the crime of 
aggression has changed its underlying properties and their relations. The 
sub-Parts then evaluate the conceptual product against the scenarios set out 
in Part II and suggest incremental modifications and/or interpretations that 
make the SWGCA’s state/collective act of aggression, as a component of 
the draft crime of aggression, more closely tailored to foreseeable acts of 
aggression poised to emerge. 
A. The Unit to Be Regulated 
1. Summary of the Argument 
The SWGCA has designed a crime that analogizes the state to a 
weapon wielded by a statesman against another state. The definition of the 
crime of aggression is more state-centric, in fact, than its parent 1974 
Definition, as this sub-part will explain. Today and in the foreseeable 
 
 96. Id. at 379. 
 97. Id. at 380. 
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future, however, as Part II forecasts, there are and will be weapons other 
than the state (as currently conceived) and aggressors besides the statesman 
that the definition of the crime of aggression fails to capture. This sub-Part 
argues that the definition of the crime of aggression should be modified 
and/or interpreted to include them, or risk irrelevance. 
2. The 1974 Definition Prior to its Incorporation into the Crime of 
Aggression 
The unit to be regulated in the draft definition of the crime of 
aggression is fashioned from the 1974 Definition, though it is, in fact, quite 
different conceptually. The preamble of the 1974 Resolution recalls “the 
duty of States under the Charter to settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in order not to endanger international peace, security and 
justice,” and reaffirms “that the territory of a State shall not be violated by 
being the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other 
measures of force.” Article 1, which begins like the preamble and many of 
the articles that follow (i.e., Arts. 3, 6, 7, 8), identifies the fundamental 
geopolitical unit as the state rather than some alternative such as an 
individual statesman, the leader of a group, or a people. Thomas and 
Thomas, legal scholars commenting on the negotiations in the run-up to the 
1974 Definition, explain that, “[s]ince the state has been the prime recipient 
of rights and duties at international law, it is the sovereign state which is 
usually regarded as the aggressor or the one against whom aggression is 
committed.”98 The explanatory note to Article 1 does not rule out the 
application of the definition to a group of states such as, presumably, a 
coalition, a treaty organization, or a union. The concept that comes into 
view throughout the definition is of states penetrating the territory of other 
states and undermining their political independence. 
This is not the whole story. The Escheresque quality of the 1974 
Definition is revealed when considering whether the state is the only 
political unit subject to the definition. According to Ferencz, the debate as 
to whether the only entities regulated should be states continued until at 
least 1971.99 Cassin, Debevoise, Kailes, and Thompson, writing at the time, 
identify the indeterminacy created by the explanatory note attached to 
Article 1: if the word State is used “without prejudice to questions of 
recognition,” there is no indication whether the de facto or the de jure 
 
 98. ANN V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 47 (1972). 
 99. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It’s Going, 66 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 491, 498 (1972) [hereinafter Ferencz, 1972]. 
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government is regulated by the definition.100 The upshot is that a violent 
insurgent group operating from the bush and claiming to be the legitimate 
government of a state can argue that it is acting in self-defense to expel a 
foreign occupier from the capital. Meanwhile, the group in power in the 
capital can claim it is defending against an (externally supported) 
insurgency. Article 1 does not resolve the question of which use of force is 
legitimate and which is not. 
Furthermore, two other political units besides the state are 
contemplated in the 1974 Definition: “armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries,” that, at the behest of a state, “carry out acts of armed force 
against another state,”101 and peoples under alien domination forcibly 
deprived of their right to self-determination.102 Under Article 3(g), armed 
bands are analogized to a weapon penetrating an enemy state, devoid of 
volition or responsibility under international law, whose actions are 
attributable to the state that sent them. Article 7, which reads like an 
aside—”Nothing in this Definition . . . could in any way prejudice the right 
to self-determination”—seems, at first glance, to have the objective of 
guaranteeing a preexisting right of peoples to struggle against colonial or 
racist regimes to establish their own state. 
Read together, however, Articles 3(g) and 7 create the trompe-l’oeil 
necessary to achieve consensus between American and Soviet blocs on the 
1974 Definition as a whole.103 According to Cassin, Debevoise, Kailes, and 
Thompson, “opinions on self-determination aided by external force divide 
along political and ideological lines. China, the Soviet Union, and some 
Third World nations vigorously support the use of force to achieve self-
determination. The United States, Japan, and the European Community 
abhor the prospect.”104 Julius Stone wrote disapprovingly of the Soviet 
Union and China, who, he felt, “tried to secure the best of both worlds”: 
while the Soviet Union tried to stress that only struggles against “colonial” 
or “racist” oppressors were covered by Article 7, China sought to limit 
 
 100. Vernon Cassin, Whitney Debevoise, Howard Kailes & Terence W. Thompson, The Definition 
of Aggression, 16 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 589, 595 (1975). 
 101. 1974 Resolution, supra note 94, art. 3(g). 
 102. Id. art. 7. 
 103. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression: 
Sieve or Substance, 10 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 701, 709-17 (1975) (describing and analyzing the 
compromise nature of the definition of aggression) [hereinafter Ferencz, 1975]; Benjamin B. Ferencz, A 
Proposed Definition of Aggression: By Compromise and Consensus, 22 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 407 
(1973) (analyzing the compromise definition that emerged from the negotiations between the competing 
blocs); Ferencz, 1972, supra note 99, at 496-501 (providing an extensive discussion of the points of 
contention between the competing blocs). 
 104. Cassin et al., supra note 101, at 599-600. 
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Article 7 to “imperialist” oppression, which Beijing associated with both 
the United States and the Soviet Union.105 The negotiated outcome is not 
radical indeterminacy, but rather, as the next paragraph explains, a legal 
trompe-l’oeil that covers the range of armed conflicts of the day and 
fluctuates, depending upon how the articles are read, between permitting 
and prohibiting the use of force by armed groups. Here is how the trompe-
l’oeil works. 
Article 3(g), read on its own, prohibits the sending of armed groups to 
carry out attacks against a State that amount to aggression. Article 7 
safeguards the right of “peoples” to “struggle” for self-determination and to 
“seek and receive support.” Read together, the two provisions meld the 
stigmatization of the use of armed force by non-state groups and the 
principle of self-determination of peoples without appearing to directly 
contradict each other. The essential element that allows the trompe-l’oeil to 
succeed is the innocuous-seeming qualifier that permits “struggles” for 
self-determination “in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in 
conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration [the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States].” The Six Powers, led by the United States, 
could interpret the Charter and the Declaration, and therefore the qualifier, 
as prohibiting the use of force by struggling armed groups, while the 
thirteen (non-aligned) Powers could interpret it as authorizing armed 
struggle for self-determination. Stone notes, “[t]he final result was to 
preserve the above preconsensual conflicts as a question of interpretation 
whether the right of peoples to ‘struggle’ includes the right to use armed 
force against the parent state and the corresponding question as to the right 
of third states to support such struggles by force.”106 Ultimately, the 
unresolved question of whether the State is the only subject of the 
definition or whether “peoples” are also contemplated and captured by the 
Resolution was built into its provisions. This intricate Cold War-era 
concept of aggression was completely altered by the SWGCA when it 
incorporated it into the definition of the crime of aggression. The way the 
1974 Definition was incorporated changed the relations between its 
properties. Rather than making the concept of aggression more relevant, the 
SWGCA made it less. 
 
 105. Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 
224, 234 (1977) [hereinafter Stone, 1977]. 
 106. Id. at 233. 
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3. The 2009 SWGCA Concept of the State/Collective Act of 
Aggression 
The SWGCA, in its final report, has included Articles 1 and 3 of the 
1974 Definition into the crime of aggression as the State act. Read alone, 
Articles 1 and 3 eradicate the Escher effect and the Cold War duality that 
characterizes the original text. As a result of the way the 1974 definition is 
incorporated into the draft crime of aggression, the draft crime fails to 
capture independent non-state groups without a state sponsor. Independent 
non-state groups are those that scenario forecasters have identified as the 
most important emerging threat to global security. The following explains 
how incorporating Articles 1 and 3 of the 1974 Definition without the rest 
has changed the concept of aggression. 
The idea of states launching armed attacks against states which, in the 
integrated 1974 Definition, is transformed by Article 7, and which 
refocuses the definition on “peoples” and their right to “struggle” for self-
determination, becomes even more state-centric when Article 7 is removed. 
Though the existence of armed non-state groups is acknowledged in Article 
3(g), non-state groups are represented exclusively as a weapon used by one 
state against another. While the 1974 Definition was capable of two 
interpretations in this regard, the definition of the crime of aggression is 
not. The state is a weapon in the hand of a statesman. 
This fixation on the state is particularly troubling in light of the 
literature on the transformation of war, which forecasts increasing 
decentralization, the state’s continued loss of its monopoly on combat 
forces, the diminishing importance of conventional war, the rise of 
superempowered groups and individuals, and intangible strategic centers of 
gravity. The reality is that states now face a common threat from 
independently acting transnational guerillas that, we are seeing, are able to 
convince populations of the legitimacy of their violence. Governments 
wishing to consolidate power in this context have an impetus to band 
together and prevent the erosion of their monopoly on the use of legitimate 
violence by reinforcing the existing war convention and criminalizing 
aggression by non-state groups and, eventually, superempowered 
individuals. International criminal law, which penetrates the state, is a 
sensible place to intervene. This would also ensure the relevance of the 
definition of the crime of aggression as times change. 
4. Suggested Modifications and/or Interpretations 
These sociological changes in the character of modern war should be 
used as a basis to modify or interpret the concept of the state/collective act. 
This can be done in one of three ways: by incrementally modifying the 
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draft definition of the crime of aggression; by interpreting it in light of the 
1974 Definition as a whole; or by interpreting the concept of the state 
dynamically, as Philip Bobbitt has done in his socio-legal scholarship.107 
In order to include non-state groups within the definition of the crime 
of aggression, the word “State” should be accompanied by “or Group,” or 
“/Group,” each time it is used to refer to the aggressor. For instance, Article 
8 bis, paragraph 1 of the definition, “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime 
of aggression’ means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a 
person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State” should instead read, “For the purpose 
of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation, 
initiation, or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State or Group” 
or, “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the 
planning, preparation, initiation, or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State/Group.”108 If the States Parties voting on the provision at 
the 2010 review conference or at a subsequent opportunity prefer to qualify 
the word “Group” for the sake of specificity, they can do so by adding the 
words “Political” or “Military” before it. Both words are consistent with 
the quality of aggression that scenario planners expect to emerge. 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute already explicitly contemplates 
organizations and groups in the provisions on crimes against humanity109 
 
 107. See generally BOBBITT, SHIELD OF ACHILLES, supra note 24, at 6 (“[T]here is no state without 
strategy, law, and history . . . . The precise nature of this composition defines a particular state . . . . 
[E]very state is some combination of these elements and can be contrasted with every other state . . . in 
these ways.”); BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT, supra note 24, at 4 (noting that there is a “change in 
the constitutional order—from nation state to market state,” and defining the market state as “[t]he 
emerging constitutional order that promises to maximize the opportunity of its people . . . . It is 
contrasted with the current nation state, the dominant constitutional order of the twentieth century that 
based its legitimacy on a promise to improve the material welfare of its people”). Mark Drumbl arrives 
at a similar conclusion as I do from his initial normative premises: “If we are agreed as to the interests 
at play, then the question follows whether criminalizing only interstate armed attacks that flagrantly 
violate the jus ad bellum captures the key stability, security, human rights, and sovereignty challenges 
that the international community currently faces. I think that the answer to this question is ‘no.’” 
Drumbl, supra note 9, at 306. 
 108. Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 7th Sess. (second 
resumption), N.Y., Feb. 9-13, 2009, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/CRP.2, Annex I, Proposals for a provision on 
aggression elaborated by the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11 (on file with the 
author). 
 109. “‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct . . . pursuant to or 
in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 104. 
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and war crimes.110 Modifying the draft definition has the advantage of 
certainty over interpreting it in one of the two ways described next. 
Delegates, however, are understandably reticent to reopen the definition to 
debate lest it undermine the agreements that have already been reached 
after years of negotiations. 
The first interpretation that would include armed groups acting 
independently of the state requires the definition of the crime of aggression 
to be read in light of the 1974 Definition as a whole. This interpretation is 
natural in light of the language of Paragraph 2 of the draft definition of the 
crime of aggression, which reads, in relevant part: 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in 
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression: 
[the list of acts from Article 3 of the 1974 Definition follows] 
The reason this reading fits naturally is that the SWGCA discussion 
about whether to include the definition in whole or in part was never 
completely resolved. While Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi’s 2002 
Discussion Paper refers to GA Resolution 3314 in its entirety—Article 2: 
“act of aggression” means an act referred to in United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 3314111—Christian Wenaweser’s 2007 drafts add two 
“disaggregated” models to the discussion, both of which include only 
Articles 1 and 3 of the 1974 Definition. The final report of the SWGCA, in 
spite of residual resistance from a number of states, settles on the 
disaggregated model that incorporates Articles 1 and 3 of the 1974 
Definition directly into the definition of the crime of aggression. The more 
sophisticated among the resisting states agreed to the direct incorporation 
of Articles 1 and 3 because of the phrase, “in accordance with United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.” 
This phrase is the channel through which aspects of the General 
Assembly’s Cold War-era concept of aggression can be read into the 
definition of the crime of aggression, for instance, the inclusion of non-
state groups. The weaknesses of this approach as a technique for including 
non-state groups within the ambit of the definition of the crime is that, as 
this sub-Part explains above, Articles 3(g) and 7 of the 1974 Definition, 
read together and in the context of the other provisions, are far from 
 
 110. “[A]rmed conflicts not of an international character . . . applies to . . . armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.” Id. art. 8(2)(f). 
 111. Preparatory Commiss’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.2 (July 11, 2002), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/documents/ 
aggression/ aggressiondocs.htm (follow link to English pdf document of 
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.2 [hereinafter 2002 Discussion Paper]. 
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determinate. This is in large part due to the Escher effect built into the 1974 
Definition. Furthermore, limiting the definition to States and peoples 
struggling for self-determination is still anachronistic in light of the variety 
of aggressive groups scenario forecasters have imagined. The strength of 
this approach, meanwhile, is that it does not require the review conference 
to reopen the draft definition to scrutiny, potentially rekindling old 
controversies and stalling the amendment process at the eleventh hour. 
The final, and I think the best, approach, despite the fact that it may at 
first seem counterintuitive to some jurists, is to read the word “State” 
dynamically and incrementally to include state-like entities. This common 
law approach to the challenge of social change preserves the conceptual 
character of the original norm while allowing it to adapt. In fact, the 
properties of the state have never been stagnant. Philip Bobbitt, in The 
Shield of Achilles and Terror and Consent, explains how the modern state 
has transformed over time, describes its various forms, and forecasts how it 
will continue to evolve. The definition of the crime of aggression should be 
adaptable enough to capture conceptual evolution lest it become 
irrelevant.112 Eventually, new political-military organizations that do not 
control territory but that attack states should be included within the ambit 
of the definition. Whether the definition will one day include acts of 
aggression against these organizations is an open question that national and 
international judges hearing aggression cases should resolve on a case-by-
case basis. The strength of this approach is that it does not reopen the draft 
definition to scrutiny at the review conference. The weakness is that judges 
interpreting the definition may be accused of judicial activism and the 
authority of their decisions challenged. 
The main policy argument for modifying or interpreting the definition 
in this way is that it broadens the definition beyond recognition. There are 
legitimate concerns that an overly broad definition may dilute its pull to 
compliance or invite the ICC and national prosecutors to exercise too much 
discretion in his or her enforcement of the law. In fact, when the other 
aspects of the definition are taken into account, such as the de minimis 
clause specifying that the attack must amount to a manifest violation of the 
UN Charter and that it must be perpetrated by the political or military 
leaders of a group, the nature of that aggressive group becomes less 
relevant. Had the definition been law at the time of the 9/11 attacks, the 
suggested modification would have included Osama bin Laden within their 
 
 112. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, that sets out the 
qualifications for statehood and which are taken by some jurists to preclude a dynamic and incremental 
interpretation of statehood, was not drafted for the purpose of international criminal law, and should 
serve as a guide for judicial interpretation, not binding authority. 
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ambit, while the current draft would not because al Qaeda is not a state. 
This is an important scenario and the diplomats should be encouraged in 
their negotiations to consider whether and how it might shape the core 
concepts, properties, and relations of their definition. The current drafting 
methods, however, do not invite discussions of this type. 
B. Distinguishing Aggression and Self-Defense 
1. Summary of the Argument 
The SWGCA has devised a procedural solution to the intractable 
problem of distinguishing aggression and self-defense. They have 
delegated responsibility for the determination to judges applying the 
provisions of the Rome Statute and the rules of customary international 
law. This is an historic advance because it marks a shift from politics to law 
in the use of force regime. In their interpretations, tribunals should be 
guided by three considerations: a just interpretation should admit no double 
standard; any rule should include widely accepted institutional checks and 
balances; and, the rule should not be a suicide pact. 
2. The 1974 Definition Prior to its Incorporation into the Crime of     
             Aggression 
Article 2 makes first strike prima facie evidence of aggression. 
However, the simple determinacy of Article 2 is another trompe-l’oeil. In 
fact, Article 2 is one of the more stark examples of the Escher effect 
deliberately built into the 1974 definition of aggression in order to 
overcome the negotiation deadlock caused by Cold War polarities. The 
seemingly paradoxical nature of the provision is the result of an all-
inclusive compromise reached between Soviet and Western blocks on the 
relevance of first strike versus intention (also referred to as “purpose” in 
the negotiations) as properties of the concept of aggression. 
At the League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and 
Limitation of Armaments in 1933, the Foreign Commissar of the Soviet 
Union, Maxim Maximovitch Litvinov, argued that prohibiting first strike 
would be the most effective deterrent to potential aggressors and submitted 
a draft definition based on this idea.113 The prohibition on first strike, also 
known as the “principle of priority,”114 was criticized by the United States 
and its allies who argued that 1) it is difficult to determine who had struck 
first; 2) historically, the first use of armed force was often provoked as a 
 
 113. Minutes of the Gen. Commiss’n, Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation 
of Armaments, Vol.II, 237-38 (September, 1933), available at http://www.letton.ch/lvx_33sdn.htm. 
 114. Cassin et al., supra note 100, at 596. 
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pretext for a massive retaliation; and 3) in the context of weapons of mass 
destruction, it would be too late to defend once the first strike had 
occurred.115 Between 1933 and 1974, the United States and its allies 
repeatedly put forth and stuck to their counterproposal that the intent or 
purpose of the belligerents was the decisive factor. The Soviets and the 
Arab states, which, in light of Israel’s preemption in the 1967 War, had 
come out in support of the principle of priority, argued that intent or 
purpose were more difficult to ascertain than first strike.116 Stone, capturing 
the essence of the debate, asked rhetorically, “[i]s the critical date of the 
Middle East Crisis 1973 or 1967, or the first attack by Arab states on Israel 
in 1948, or is it the Balfour Declaration in 1917, or the Arab invasions and 
conquest of the seventh century, or even perhaps the initial Israelite 
conquest of the thirteenth century B.C.?”117 Neither the principle of priority 
nor the principle of intent offered a clear solution. 
The technique for arriving at a compromise on the priority versus 
intent controversy in 1974, according to Ferencz, was “to employ language 
that enabled the parties on both sides to interpret the Article to suit their 
own prior conception”—the Escher effect writ large.118 In particular, first 
strike is decisive (satisfying the Soviet Union and the Arab states), so long 
as the strike is 1) in contravention of the UN Charter (no further guidance 
is given as to which interventions amount to a Charter contravention); 2) 
the Security Council has not determined that the “act of aggression is 
justified” (i.e., a justifiable response to provocation, protection against 
economic aggression, or preemptive self-defense); or 3) the acts concerned 
or their consequences are of sufficient gravity (no guidance is given as to 
which acts or consequences meet the de minimis threshold). Rather than 
resolving the debate over how to distinguish aggression and self-defense, 
the 1974 Definition built the two dominant positions into its articles. 
3. The 2009 SWGCA Distinction Between Aggression and Self- 
             Defense 
The SWGCA solution to the problem of distinguishing aggression and 
self-defense, as introduced earlier, is procedural, not substantive. Article 2 
of the 1974 Definition contains the paradoxical principles of priority and 
intent. When Article 2 is removed from the 1974 Definition, as the 
SWGCA has done in its definition of the crime of aggression, both 
 
 115. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining Aggression—the Last Mile, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 430, 
443 (1973) [hereinafter Ferencz, 1973]. 
 116. Stone, 1977, supra note 105, at 229. 
 117. Id. at 236. 
 118. Ferencz, 1975, supra note 103, at 711. 
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principles evaporate from the resulting concept of aggression, and 
aggression becomes, “the use of armed force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations” (Art. 2). 
The SWGCA formulation, which contains neither the principle of priority 
nor the principle of intent, blurs the distinction between aggression and 
self-defense. Whether the SWGCA product is blurrier than the 1974 
Definition, which contains both principles and offers no guidance as to how 
to balance them, is difficult to ascertain. What is clear is that today, unlike 
in 1974, there is a network of judicial bodies including the ICC and the 
criminal tribunals of member states, which have incorporated the 
provisions of the Rome Statute into their national laws, that can draw upon 
customary international law on the use of force and predetermined rules of 
evidence and procedure to judge whether a particular claim to self-defense 
is justified or pretextual. The removal of the principles of priority and 
intent from the definition of the state/collective act, by blurring the line 
between aggression and self-defense, is both realistic and risky. 
Four dominant schools of thought have emerged in the contemporary 
reappraisal of the international law of self-defense, a reappraisal that has 
attracted a vast literature since the release of the National Security Strategy 
of the United States in 2002.119 The traditionalists argue that the principle 
of priority is still the most reasonable rule since relaxing the prohibition on 
first-strikes creates a Zeno’s paradox where states are pressured to preempt 
each other’s preemptions.120 Opponents of the traditional view invoke the 
collapse of the League of Nations, and warn that the international legal 
system will not survive if divorced from strategic realities and the practice 
of the great powers. The skeptics, on the other hand, believe that the 
survival of states is not a matter of law. Michael Glennon, a professor at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, has proclaimed the death of the 
Charter prohibitions on the use of force.121 According to Glennon, coherent 
international law concerning intervention by states no longer exists. The 
received rules neither describe accurately what nations do, nor predict 
reliably what they will do, nor describe intelligently what they should do. 
 
 119. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (Sept. 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/; for a range of 
views, see Lori F. Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 553 (2003). 
 120. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 207-29 (1980) (describing the 
notion of reciprocal fear of surprise attack). 
 121. Glennon, How International Rules Die, supra note 11; Glennon, The Fog of Law, supra note 
11; Glennon, Terrorism and the Limits of Law, supra note 11; Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, 
supra note 11, at A37. 
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The implication is that preemption should be the prerogative of each state. 
The weakness of the skeptics’ approach is that it justifies the law of the 
jungle. 
Between the traditionalists and the skeptics lie two reformist schools, 
the extenders and the exceptionists. The extenders would widen the 
imminence standard contained in the Caroline correspondence, an 
exchange of letters in the early 1840s between the United States and 
Britain, which has become a classic, though contested, statement of the law 
of self-defense in international law.122 According to this standard, “the use 
of defensive force is permitted when the “[n]ecessity of that self-defense is 
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”123 The English legal scholar Christopher Greenwood, for 
example, argues that received international law does not require States to 
wait until it is too late, but it does not give a broad general license for 
preemptive military action either.124 When determining whether an attack is 
imminent, the gravity of the threat and the way it would materialize are 
both relevant. Greenwood’s proposal would accommodate the use of force 
against a non-state group in possession of weapons of mass destruction, 
even if the moment of the attack remains uncertain. However, 
Greenwood’s reliance on a subjective threshold, rather than an objectively 
verifiable armed attack, invites abuse. 
The exceptionists would preserve the received framework, but 
incorporate different types of exceptions. An increasing number of 
international lawyers have suggested carving out nuclear proliferation as a 
special category triggering a right of preemptive self-defense. They 
advocate lowering the imminence bar because the nuclear threat is so 
catastrophic. Michael Reisman proposes another type of exception.125 
Reisman, like the traditionalists, warns that legalizing unilateral preemptive 
self-defense might increase the expectation of, and resort to, violence and 
undermine world order. He would curtail self-defense in international law, 
but make an exception for the United States, which, he argues, now has a 
 
 122. David A. Sadoff, A Question of Determinacy: The Legal Status of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 
40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 523, 535-36 (2009). 
 123. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 9 
(2002) (quoting JOHN B. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906)), http:// 
www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf; HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND ARMED CONFLICT, 91-96 (1992); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 150-52 (1991). 
 124. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, 
Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 15-16 (2003). 
 125. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 82, 90 (2003). 
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unique role as guarantor of world order. According to Reisman, the Bush 
doctrine contained in NSS 2002 stabilizes expectations without 
undermining the international system.126 However, Reisman’s suggestion 
requires states to accept American hegemony and trust American 
commitments to use its military might for the collective good. 
Alternatively, Tom Franck proposes mitigation as a legal safety valve 
that preserves the rule of law but prevents it from rendering unreasonable 
results in exceptional cases.127 When strict adherence to the law would lead 
to catastrophic results, Franck argues that states withhold judgment—just 
as domestic courts have withheld judgment when small groups stranded on 
a lifeboat eat the cabin boy so the rest of the castaways can survive. He 
argues that the majority of states withheld judgment after Israel’s 1967 War 
with its Arab neighbors and after the NATO bombing of Kosovo. The 
problem with Franck’s proposal is that it does not guide state behavior—
the exception only applies after the military intervention occurs. 
4. Suggested Interpretations 
Removing Article 2 of the 1974 Definition does not resolve the debate 
over the scope of self-defense. Rather, it pushes its resolution to the ICC 
judges who are required to make interpretations in concrete cases. 
Removing Article 2 would represent a conscious choice on the part of the 
SWGCA to recast the question of self-defense as a legal rather than a 
political issue, at least in the domain of international criminal law. This is a 
positive development. Judges considering concrete cases, unlike working 
groups negotiating general principles, have the capacity to devise nuanced 
case-by-case solutions that, over time, and in the aggregate—like the 
common law—may reveal guiding principles. Furthermore, the 
considerations guiding the judicial decisions of ICC judges are less 
politicized than the positions of SWGCA delegations representing the 
interests of their nations and therefore have the potential to constitute an 
impartial, and ideally, a generalizable, approach for fairly adjudicating 
cases. Critics of judge-made law in the domain of high politics resist what 
they consider to be the judicialization of politics and point out the lack of 
democratic accountability of ICC judges. They argue that peace is better 
promoted through flexibility and political negotiation rather than through 
law. Ferencz and others retort that the current framework of high politics 
has failed to curb war and that the time for a legal approach is upon us. 
 
 126. See id. at 87, 90. 
 127. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED 
ATTACKS 174 (2002). 
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In their decisions, judges adjudicating aggression cases should be 
guided by three considerations. First, a just interpretation should admit no 
double standard. Exceptionally, if certain states are granted special powers, 
they should also have special responsibilities to use them for the aggregate 
good of the community. The non-proliferation treaty was designed this 
way. Non-nuclear powers were not supposed to acquire nuclear weapons 
and, in exchange, nuclear powers were meant to disarm. The nuclear 
powers did not fulfill their side of the bargain and the double standard has 
undermined the treaty’s pull to compliance. Today, survey Iranians on 
whether the NPT is a just regime and the vast majority will answer “no.” 
The double standard criteria would eliminate Reisman’s proposed 
exception to the current use of force regime for the United States. 
Second, any rule should include widely accepted institutional checks 
and balances. It is a basic principle of fairness recognized all over the 
world that a party to a dispute should not also be the judge because people 
and groups tend to favor their own cause. In spite of its failings, the most 
legitimate institutional body to authorize the use of force is still the 
Security Council. But the reality is that the Council is a political body often 
deadlocked on points of self-interest, and it cannot always be relied upon to 
decide fairly. In cases of Security Council deadlock, ICC judges should 
also take account of the authorization of established regional bodies, like 
the African Union or the Organization of American States—i.e., the next 
most legitimate institutional body to authorize force after the SC—since 
they have an interest in maintaining a stable neighborhood. Finally, judges 
should consider whether the case for self-defense was made publicly, 
giving as much information as could safely be divulged at one of these 
bodies before acting. If the attack is imminent, and time does not permit 
deliberation, the self-defense justification should be formally evaluated by 
the ICC judges after the fact. The 2002 and 2006 U.S. National Security 
Strategies go too far in their unilateralism. 
Third, the rule applied by the ICC judges should not be a suicide pact. 
The imminence standard should be relaxed somewhat when the threat is 
catastrophic. However, it would be dangerous to relax the standard absent 
an increased commitment by states to justify their armed interventions 
before the most legitimate international forum available, starting with the 
Security Council. If the Security Council, the local regional organization, 
and maybe the General Assembly, as a last resort, deny the legitimacy of 
the military intervention, this is strong evidence for the ICC judges that the 
use of force was illegal and unjustified. For their part, these institutions 
must be prepared to convene and decide rapidly. Ultimately, a just 
interpretation of the law of self-defense will wisely counterbalance the 
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risks of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of extremists and the 
risks of creating an environment where no checks and balances exist to 
restrain the arbitrary use of military power. 
C. The Acts that Qualify as Aggression 
1. The 1974 Definition Prior to Its Incorporation into the Crime of 
Aggression 
At first glance, the 1974 Definition seems to prohibit only the use of 
“armed force,” not other uses of force. According to Article 1, “Aggression 
is the use of armed force by a State against another state.” Article 2 
prohibits the first use of “armed force.” All of the acts of aggression listed 
in Article 3—invasion, bombing, blockade, etc.—include the use of armed 
force. 
The use of armed force was not, however, the only use of force that 
the General Assembly committees considered including. A protracted 
debate over the inclusion or exclusion of so-called economic aggression 
risked paralyzing the working group. The 1967 and 1973 Oil Embargoes, 
whereby the oil-producing Arab states sought to deter Israel’s allies from 
supporting it militarily by denying them oil, were fresh in the minds of 
many delegates. According to Julius Stone, “[a] substantial body of states 
continued to press in the Special Committee for inclusion of economic 
aggression in the definition.”128 In the midst of paralyzing controversy, the 
Special Committee once again accommodated competing positions by 
using the drafting technique that gives the 1974 Definition its Escheresque 
quality. 
In particular, the concept of aggression, which appears 
incontrovertible from the perspective of Articles 1, 2, and 3, becomes 
bifurcated when considered in light of the definition as a whole. Article 4 
qualifies the list of uses of armed force amounting to aggression: “The acts 
enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may 
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the 
Charter.” The SWGCA, however, after years of debates, chose not to 
include Article 4 of the 1974 Definition in its definition of the crime of 
aggression lest it violate the principle of legality by failing to forewarn 
potential perpetrators of the acts that are prohibited. 
In addition, as Stone points out, “the fact that an alleged aggressor’s 
use of armed force had been in response to extreme economic coercion 
might be held by the Security Council [or, in the future, the ICC] to be 
 
 128. Stone, 1977, supra note 105, at 230. 
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among the ‘other relevant circumstances’ which, under Article 2 of the 
Consolidated Text [the first use of force is a prima facie act of aggression], 
might lead to the conclusion that a finding of aggression was not 
justified.”129 The 1974 Definition was drafted so that no concept, including 
economic aggression, could be used as a sword by one superpower without 
also being used as a shield by the other—so long as their international 
lawyers grasped its Escheresque quality. 
Article 5(1) qualifies Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 still further. According to 
Article 5(1), “No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, 
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for 
aggression.” This seems to cut Stone’s argument down—read literally, the 
use of armed force cannot be justified as self-defense in response to 
economic aggression. However, read literally, Article 5(1) also removes the 
use of armed force as a justified response to an armed attack—no military 
consideration can serve as a justification for aggression. 
This cannot be correct: the inherent right to self-defense is enshrined 
in Article 51 of the UN Charter and general international law. The way to 
reconcile Article 51 with the articles preceding it is to notice that no 
consideration, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may 
serve as a justification for aggression, rather than the use of armed force. In 
other words, the use of armed force short of aggression may be justified in 
response to political, economic, or military offensives. Whether the use of 
economic, diplomatic, or today, cyber force, can trigger the right to use 
armed force in self-defense depends upon the interpretation of the 1974 
Resolution as a whole. 
2. The 2009 SWGCA Concept of the State/Collective Act of 
Aggression 
The delicate structure of the 1974 Definition, which simultaneously 
includes and excludes the use of force not qualifying as armed force within 
its provisions, depending upon how the Definition is read, is disturbed 
when Articles 2, 4, and 5 are removed, as the SWGCA has done. Articles 1 
and 3 of the 1974 Definition, the only articles to be included in the 
definition of the crime of aggression, are incontrovertible—only the use of 
armed force is prohibited. The removal of the other articles limits the 
SWGCA definition of aggression at a time when military planners foresee 
an imminent increase in unarmed attacks, including sabotage and 
cyberattacks, that disrupt networked systems and cause massive damage. 
 
 129. Id. 
COPY OF WEISBORD_FMT3.NOV18.DOC 11/20/2009  12:53:44 PM 
2009] CONCEPTUALIZING AGGRESSION 39 
The SWGCA did, however, deliberately build in what some 
participants considered “constructive ambiguity” as a diplomatic solution 
to the debate over whether the list of prohibited acts should be open or 
closed.130 Article 8 bis, paragraph 2, which reads, “[a]ny of the following 
acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 
qualify as an act of aggression,” may be interpreted as either closing or 
opening the list that follows. This is because the ambiguous phrase “any of 
the following acts” gives little indication as to whether these are the only 
acts that qualify as acts of aggression or whether they are meant as 
examples. Though this “constructive ambiguity” may leave a tribunal 
interpreting the crime some leeway to add new acts, it does not resolve the 
question of whether armed attacks are the only acts prohibited by the 
definition. 
3. Suggested Modifications and Interpretations 
Systems disruption, including cyberattacks causing damage akin to an 
armed attack, should be included as acts of aggression. This can be done in 
one of four ways: the word “armed” can be replaced by another word such 
as “destructive”; the crime of aggression can be interpreted in light of the 
original 1974 Definition; the listed acts can be incrementally expanded by 
analogy; or the word “armed” can be interpreted broadly to include any 
tool capable of disrupting a system and causing massive damage. 
Replacing the word “armed” in “armed attack” with “destructive” 
shifts the focus of the act of aggression from means to effects. Rather than 
the attack being “armed,” it must be “destructive” to violate the provision. 
In the context of criminal law, this means intentionally destructive. This 
modification has the advantage of including future acts that are difficult to 
foresee within the ambit of the crime. It accords, moreover, with the moral 
sentiment that intentionally destructive behavior is blameworthy by 
whatever means it is committed. The weakness of the approach is that it 
may overreach, including normal competitive behavior among states. 
Another disadvantage is that proposing a controversial drafting 
modification of this sort at the review conference, one not firmly based 
upon existing international law, may stall the negotiations at the eleventh 
hour. 
 
 130. International Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of States Parties, 6th Sess., Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, held at Lichtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson 
School, Princeton University, United States, June 11-14, 2007, ¶ 47, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1. 
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Another way unarmed systems disruptions can be included within the 
ambit of the crime is for jurists to interpret the definition of the crime of 
aggression in light of the 1974 Definition. As discussed earlier, this 
interpretation is natural in light of the language of Paragraph 2 of the draft 
definition of the crime of aggression which reads, in relevant part, “Any of 
the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance 
with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression.” This could allow for the 
inclusion of new means of violence into the list of prohibited acts through 
Article 4 of the 1974 Definition, which reads, “The acts enumerated above 
are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts 
constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.” Two problems 
arise, however, and both were raised in the SWGCA debates. First, an open 
list may violate the principle of legality in criminal law whereby an 
accused must be forewarned of the prohibited behavior in order to be 
punished for it.131 Second, and related, the Security Council should be kept 
separate from the court during the trial or the court’s independence will be 
challenged and its legitimacy may be undermined. 
An alternative is to analogize from the listed acts to include new acts 
of aggression. For example, a denial of service cyberattack, whereby 
hackers overwhelm government, military, or other essential systems and 
prevent communication with the outside world, may be analogized to a 
blockade. There are three main problems with this approach. The first is 
that the first sentence of Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute explicitly 
prohibits this sort of judicial interpretation: “The definition of a crime shall 
be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.” The second 
problem is that not every systems disruption will have an analogy in the list 
of prohibited acts. The third problem is that analogizing from the list of 
prohibited acts does not get around the explicit identification of “armed 
attack” as a requirement for an act to qualify as aggression. 
The fourth, and I think the best, solution is for jurists to read the word 
“armed” in “armed attack” broadly. Whatever tool is used to attack an 
enemy, whether it is a wrench disabling an oil pipeline, a bucket of water 
poured on a sensitive electronic device, or a personal computer planting a 
virus into a government network, should be considered an armament if the 
intention is aggressive and the damage surpasses the de minimis threshold, 
amounting to a violation of the UN Charter. This interpretation does not 
violate article 22(2) of the Rome Statute because no analogy is necessary, 
 
 131. Id. ¶ 50. 
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only a broad reading of the word “armed.” Furthermore, the SWGCA does 
not need to negotiate any changes to the existing language of the provision. 
The larger point, however, is that at a time when warfare is changing 
and new methods of committing aggression are becoming increasingly 
dangerous, inexpensive, and prevalent, the drafters of the crime of 
aggression should employ a method that is forward- as well as backward- 
looking. Rather than just negotiating the appropriate precedents and the 
way that they are to be incorporated, the drafters and interpreters of the 
definition should also consider how new contingencies should impact its 
core concepts, properties, and relations. 
D. The 1974 Concept of Aggression is Escheresque 
The way we evaluate the Escheresque property of the 1974 Resolution 
depends upon our understanding of the purpose and function of 
international law. The international legal scholars of the day wrestled with 
the problem, and their theoretical orientations are evident from their 
expectations of what the definition would achieve. Stone’s disappointment 
with the text permeates his analysis: 
It is indeed dramatic to the point of high tragedy—or is it low 
comedy?—that so many of the issues on which the Consensus Definition 
of 1974 is silent, or builds into itself the head-on conflicts in the 
standpoints of states, are rather central and critical for contemporary 
international crises and tensions.132 
In this passage, Stone reveals his expectation that legal texts are meant 
to be determinate, systematic, and authoritative, and in this regard, his 
analysis can be characterized as formalistic. His disappointment stems from 
the fact that the 1974 Definition does not accord with the formalist ideal. 
Looking back at the 1974 Definition in 2007, Ferencz draws a 
different conclusion, a conclusion more in line with the functionalist 
sensibility of the international legal establishment of the post World War II 
era: “[t]he wording left no doubt that the 1974 consensus definition of 
aggression bound no one. It reflected the fears, doubts, and hesitations of 
its time. However, it was also a cautious step toward a more rational world 
order.”133 Ferencz’s optimism, in spite of the observation, which he shares 
with Stone, that the 1974 Definition binds no one, stems from his faith in 
the legal process, born at Nuremberg, and his forecast that international law 
is headed in the direction of a liberal order.134 On the legal process, Ferencz 
 
 132. Stone, 1977, supra note 105, at 225. 
 133. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, 6 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 551, 556 (2007) [hereinafter Ferencz, 2007]. 
 134. Ferencz states: 
COPY OF WEISBORD_FMT3.NOV18.DOC 11/20/2009  12:53:44 PM 
42 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:1 
wrote, “[t]he voluntary surrender of a bit of sovereignty in favor of a 
reasonable process for the adjudication of such differences as are bound to 
arise, and a system of enforceable sanctions, are further requirements if 
reason is to replace barbarism.”135 The creation of the ICC in 1998 fuelled 
Ferencz’s optimism that the 1974 Definition would advance his lifelong 
project to replace war with law.136 It remains to be seen whether the ICC 
will ever have an opportunity to interpret the definition to resolve cases 
and, if so, whether it is capable of advancing Ferencz’s lifelong dream of 
subverting the law of force with the rule of law.137 
Though the state act of the SWGCA definition of aggression is 
ultimately more determinate than the 1974 Definition, it is also less 
flexible. This is regrettable when there is finally an institutional 
arrangement, the Rome System’s network of courts (including the ICC), to 
interpret the law and apply it in concrete cases. It is true that determinacy 
has its advantages in the judicial realm: a criminal provision that is stark is 
less likely to violate the principle of legality and, at the hands of an able 
defense team, result in technical acquittals of otherwise blameworthy 
 
The consensus definition of aggression is only a tiny fragment in a much broader mosaic. It is 
a tool which may be used to help build a more peaceful society of States. States that recognize 
that they are interdependent and not independent, that cherish and nurture their cultural and 
religious heritages without seeking to impose them on anyone else, that have the right to 
organize their own political and economic systems in whatever manner seems to them to best 
serve the happiness of their peoples, must also recognize that, in their own self-interest, they 
may have to surrender some portion of their sovereignty, their wealth and their power in order 
that the hopes and aspirations of all mankind may be fulfilled. 
Ferencz, 1975, supra note 103, at 717. 
 135. Ferencz, 1973, supra note 115, at 462. 
 136. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Reconciling Legitimate Concerns and Removing the Lock from the 
Courthouse Door, May 2008, http://www.benferencz.org/ (follow “Articles and Lectures” hyperlink; 
then follow “Speaking Frankly About Aggression” hyperlink). 
 137. What holds true for Stone and Ferencz can be generalized to other theorists of international 
law. The way that they evaluate the 1974 Definition, whether they actually undertook that exercise or 
not, depends upon their expectations about the purpose and function of international law. Myres 
McDougal and Harold Lasswell’s policy-oriented school of jurisprudence, developed at the time the 
1974 Definition was being negotiated, eschewed positivist approaches and held that the overriding goal 
of international law was to arrive at solutions that reflect the global common interest in approximating a 
world public order of human dignity. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Legal Regulation 
of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J. 
1057 (1959); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR: 
TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (New Haven Press 1994) (1961 originally 
published as LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL COERCION). Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas Lowenfeld’s international 
legal process school, developed at Harvard Law School in the 1960s, with its confidence in institutional 
settlement, concentrates not so much on the exposition of rules and their content as on how international 
law rules are actually deployed by the makers of foreign policy. ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & 
ANDREAS LOWENFELD, 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY 
COURSE (1968). 
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defendants. The risk, however, is that an inflexible crime will undermine 
the legitimacy of the court and the law in other ways, in particular by 
becoming irrelevant as times change. The challenge, faced by the drafters 
of the crime of aggression but not unique to them, is how to best balance 
the demands of certainty and flexibility in their definition. The grounded 
theory method offers them specific insights about how to go about doing 
this. Once the definition is implemented, the judges take over and are faced 
with the same challenge as they interpret the law. 
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING THE INDIVIDUAL’S PARTICIPATION IN 
COLLECTIVE ACT OF AGGRESSION 
In his essay, Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War 
Crimes, David Cohen poses the key question for this part of the paper. 
Unlike ordinary domestic crimes, mass atrocities are, 
the product of collective, systematic, bureaucratic activity, made possible 
only by the collaboration of massive and complex organizations in the 
execution of criminal policies initiated at the highest levels of 
government. How, then, is individual responsibility to be located, 
limited, and defined within the vast bureaucratic apparatuses that make 
possible the pulling of a trigger or the dropping of a gas canister in some 
far-flung place?138 
The SWGCA has negotiated an answer to Cohen’s question in the 
form of three interrelated legal mechanisms that serve as a conceptual link 
between the individual and the state/collective act: 1) a leadership clause; 
2) a set of conduct verbs describing the culpable conduct; and 3) a liability 
doctrine setting out the nature of the defendant’s relationship to the 
aggressive group. The following sub-Parts consider these components in 
turn, test them against the future aggression scenarios set out in Part II, and, 
following the grounded theory approach through, suggest incremental 
modifications and interpretations that bring the definition of the crime of 
aggression up to date. 
A. The Leadership Clause 
The leadership clause is a phrase within the definition of the crime of 
aggression that limits the reach of the crime to leaders and excludes 
followers. Since Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, Coordinator of the 
PrepCom working group, released her 2002 Discussion Paper, there has 
been near consensus among delegates that the crime of aggression should 
 
 138. David Cohen, Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War Crimes, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA, 53, 53 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 
1999). 
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apply only to leaders and that a leader is a person “in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State.”139 The components of the leadership clause are, 1) the position of 
the person in the organization, 2) his or her capacity to exercise effective 
control or to direct, 3) political or military action, and 4) the nature of the 
aggressive collective as a state. This sub-Part, as the previous sub-Parts of 
Part III have done, will situate the draft leadership clause historically, 
decipher its components, test these components against the future scenarios 
set out in Part II, and suggest incremental modifications and interpretations 
that will tailor this clause to the future aggression scenarios set out in 
Part II. 
1. Conceptual Roots of the Leadership Clause 
The SWGCA leadership clause is descended from an influential pre-
World War II concept of leadership set out by the German sociologist Max 
Weber that is still relevant today, but not nearly as much as it was when 
Weber devised it and when the Nuremberg tribunals delivered their 
verdicts. In Politics as a Vocation, Weber sets out his evolutionary 
taxonomy of political leadership with three methods to “legitimate any 
rule,” from least to most advanced.140 Traditional leadership, “exercised by 
the patriarchs and patrimonial rulers of the old style,” is “sanctified by a 
validity that extends back into the mists of time and is perpetuated by 
habit.”141 Charismatic leadership, “practiced by prophets or—in the 
political sphere—the elected warlord or the ruler chosen by popular vote, 
the great demagogue, and the leaders of political parties,” finds its authority 
in the “extraordinary, personal gift of grace or charisma, that is, the wholly 
personal devotion to, and a personal trust in, the revelations, heroism, or 
other leadership qualities of an individual.”142 Weber’s highest form of 
leadership, “rule by virtue of ‘legality’,” “found in the modern ‘servant of 
the state’,” is authoritative by virtue of “the belief in the validity of legal 
 
 139. 2002 Discussion Paper, supra note 111, art. 1; ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th 
Sess., New York. Jan. 29-Feb. 1, 2007, Discussion Paper Proposed by the Chairman, at I(1)(a)-(b), 
ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, Annex, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-5-
SWGCA-2_English.pdf [hereinafter Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper]; Non-Paper by the Chairman 
on Defining the Individual’s Conduct, in ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, 6th Sess., New York, Nov. 30-Dec. 14, 2007, Report of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, Annex, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/1, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-1_English.pdf [hereinafter Chairman’s 2007 
Non-Paper on Defining the Individual’s Conduct]. 
 140. MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1919), reprinted in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 34 
(David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004) (emphasis omitted). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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statutes and practical ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules.”143 
Weber’s highest form of leadership corresponds to his concept of 
bureaucracy, a rational-legal structure of authority, which he described and 
popularized in Economy and Society in 1914.144 When Weber wrote 
Economy and Society, bureaucracy was becoming the most effective means 
of coordinating large organizations, including governments and militaries. 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) based its 
reasoning upon an organizational model that coincides closely with 
Weber’s when judging the Nazis after World War II. Subsequently, the 
Nuremberg precedent became the inspiration for the Rome Statute and the 
emerging definition of the Crime of Aggression, born of the London 
Charter’s Article 6(1), “Crimes Against Peace.” The IMT, after a brief 
introduction and description of the provisions of the London Charter, 
presented a detailed history of the evolution of the bureaucratic structure of 
the Nazi organization and its consolidation of power.145 This is an account 
of the charismatic leader, Hitler, and his willing accomplices, the 
defendants, as they transformed a “small political party called the German 
Labor Party”146 into an all-pervasive and rationally organized government 
bureaucracy legitimized by law, where the defendants held top offices and 
used the organization to engineer massive crimes. 
Even though the IMT judgment reflected a Weberian concept of 
leadership, there were glimmers of recognition by the tribunal that the 
bureaucratic model did not capture the whole story of the Nazis’ rise to and 
exercise of power. For example, the IMT and its successor tribunals 
wrestled with the status of business leaders, non-state actors who did not 
hold formal positions or exercise effective control in the Nazis’ 
bureaucratic apparatus, but whom the Allied populations felt should be held 
criminally responsible nonetheless. “Hitler could not make aggressive war 
by himself,” the IMT held: “[h]e had to have the cooperation of statesmen, 
military leaders, diplomats and business men.”147 The successor tribunals 
followed the lead of the IMT and prosecuted business leaders for waging 
aggressive war. The I.G. Farben Judgment affirmed that business leaders 
are included, as a matter of law, in the provision on crimes against peace,148 
 
 143. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 144. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956 
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). 
 145. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 413-21. 
 146. Id. at 413. 
 147. Id. at 448. 
 148. However, the defendants were acquitted because the tribunal found that “[t]he evidence falls 
far short of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that their endeavours and activities [the rearmament 
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but the disproportionate number of acquittals of business leaders in relation 
to political and military leaders in this case and others indicates uneasiness 
on the part of the judges with the prospect of including them within the 
ambit of the crime.149 
Ultimately, in spite of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s reflections on 
business leaders, its core concept of leadership envisaged an individual 
holding high office or a high top position within a complex bureaucracy, 
exercising formal and effective control over the political or military action 
of a state. This was a sociologically accurate description of leadership 
within the Nazi organization. The Nuremberg concept of leadership, which 
serves as the basis of the leadership clause of the definition of the crime of 
aggression, is not a sociologically accurate description of leadership within 
Al Qaeda and the vast number of aggressive organizations emerging today. 
It does not require a major redrafting or a radical interpretation, however, 
to bring the clause up to date. 
2. The Leadership Clause in the Draft Definition of the Crime of 
             Aggression 
The SWGCA, in order to remain true to precedent and garner the 
greatest possible support at the 2010 review conference, closely modeled 
the leadership clause of the crime of aggression upon the Nuremberg 
Tribunal’s concept. The SWGCA, however, made two slight modifications 
that broaden the modern concept somewhat. These modifications 
acknowledge the changing character of leadership, but are still not adequate 
to capture new forms of leadership that scenario forecasters such as 
Heckscher and Donnellon150 anticipate. The first modification is a shift in 
focus from formal position to include effective control as a marker of 
leadership: “‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control.” The second is the insertion of the word “direct” as an alternative 
way that an individual may be identified as a leader. 
By including “effective control” as a core property of leadership rather 
than only formal “position,” the SWGCA has created a definition that 
 
of Germany] were undertaken and carried out with the knowledge that they were thereby preparing 
Germany for participation in an aggressive war.” I.G. Farben, International Military Tribunal, 
Judgment, July 30, 1948, at 1123, reprinted in VIII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS (1952). 
 149. In I.G. Farben, 24 defendants were acquitted because the tribunal found that “[t]he evidence 
falls far short of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that their endeavours and activities [the 
rearmament of Germany] were undertaken and carried out with the knowledge that they were thereby 
preparing Germany for participation in an aggressive war.” I.G. Farben, supra note 148, at 1123. 
 150. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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includes informal leaders—individuals who hold no formal position but 
who effectively control the political or military action of a state. This 
inclusion would, for instance, capture business and religious leaders while 
formal control would not. Though effective control is a sociologically 
appropriate evolution from formal position because it captures important 
contemporary aspects of leadership, it suffers from two problems as a 
property of the leadership qualifier of the crime of aggression. The first is 
its conceptual origin as a transplant from an unrelated legal context. The 
second is that “effective control” does not go far enough to capture the 
leaders of post-bureaucratic organizations. 
“Effective control” is the standard the International Court of Justice 
used in 1986 to assess whether the United States should be held 
accountable for acts carried out by Contra guerillas in Nicaragua.151 It was 
not originally meant as a way to attribute state action to an individual 
leader. The “effective control” standard gives the impression of being 
legitimate precedent for the SWGCA without actually being on point. 
Strictly speaking, it should not lend legitimacy to the definition of the 
crime of aggression by virtue of its precedential value. Overlooking, for the 
moment, the question of its conceptual origins, the “effective control” 
standard was later countenanced by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia in the Tadić Case by a more permissive “overall 
control” test152 that would have done a better job at capturing the 
individuals most responsible in post-bureaucratic organizations. “Effective 
control” would likely not have captured Osama Bin Laden’s involvement 
in the 9/11 attacks, while “overall control” would have had a better chance. 
The main problem with the “effective control” standard, whatever its 
origins may be, is that, as the grounded theorists would say, it does not fit 
well with the changing structure of aggressive organizations (see Part II). 
Rather than formal or effective control, centrality within a social network 
and the influence of an individual within that network are rapidly emerging 
as important properties of leadership.153 Centrality and influence within the 
disaggregated network of networks that is al Qaeda would encapsulate Bin 
Laden and link him to the 9/11 attacks, while effective control would not. 
3. Suggested Modifications and/or Interpretations 
Three avenues exist for incorporating contemporary social scientific 
insights into the leadership clause of the crime of aggression: the SWGCA 
 
 151. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
65 (June 27). 
 152. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 146 (July 15, 1999). 
 153. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
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can modify the clause and present it to states to vote on at the 2010 review 
conference; the SWGCA can build the changes into the elements of the 
crime of aggression; or, the judges can read the changes into the existing 
clause through the word “direct.” 
If the SWGCA chooses to modify the leadership clause, one possible 
formulation is: 
A leader is a [central/focal] person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over[, determinatively influence,] or to direct the political or 
military action of a State [/Group]. 
This formulation is closely based upon the original SWGCA 
leadership clause, but it includes modifications derived from forecasts on 
leadership that can be incorporated independently of one another or in 
conjunction. 
First, these drafting changes capture leaders within the bureaucratic 
model who are “in a position” to exercise control over subordinates. The 
Weberian property of formal position, an element of his pure-type rational-
legal authority, was the original inspiration for this component of the 
leadership clause. The SWGCA leadership clause might be modified to 
include individuals in post-bureaucratic organizations who exercise power 
by virtue of their central or focal position in the organization by adding one 
of these terms into the definition (the first set of square brackets above). 
However, because of the ambiguity of the word “position”—it might as 
easily refer to formal position as position within a social network—an 
explicit modification of the existing leadership clause is not strictly 
necessary. If the SWGCA wishes to make the double meaning of the term 
“position” explicit in order to put the expansion of the concept of 
leadership to a vote by States, it can do so in the elements of the crime. 
Alternatively, the ASP can choose to leave it to the judges to decide on the 
meaning of “position.” In this case, the bench must be aware of the possible 
double meaning. This can be done by clearly describing the double 
meaning of “position” in an official report of the SWGCA or at the review 
conference. 
Effective control is the second Weberian concept that should be 
expanded to capture aggressive leaders within post-bureaucratic 
organizations. In the discussion above, “influence” was identified as an 
alternative component of responsibility that has supplemented, and 
frequently replaced, the concept of effective control in aggressive 
organizations. The terms “determinatively influence” could be added to the 
existing leadership clause to bring it up to date. The nature of this influence 
can be narrow or broad and preceded by a qualifier akin to 
“determinatively,” or not. The key modification is that the term “influence” 
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captures charismatic (or transformational) leaders,154 brokers between 
organizations,155 and catalysts,156 whereas the Nuremberg-era concept does 
not. Instead of explicitly altering the existing leadership clause, the term 
“or to direct” may be read to include “determinatively influence.” States 
preferring to supplement “effective control” with “influence” (with or 
without a qualifier akin to “determinatively”) might, as with the first 
proposed modification described above, build “influence” into the elements 
or leave it to the judges to interpret the term “direct” to include it. 
4. The Conduct Verbs 
The conduct verbs are meant to link the individual leader to the 
collective act of aggression by describing what the leader actually does—
the culpable conduct. The conduct verbs in the emerging crime of 
aggression were extracted directly from Article 6(a) of the London Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, except the last one, 
which is a modern variation on the Nuremberg-era verb.157 There is a near 
consensus among SWGCA delegates that “planning, preparation, initiation 
and execution” of an act of aggression/armed attack is the culpable 
conduct.158 These conduct verbs are based on a Nuremberg-era concept of 
leadership, a concept that, in this section, will be tested against an 
important contemporary critique. 
5. Conceptual Roots of the Conduct Verbs 
The Nuremberg-era conduct verbs correspond closely with the 
behavioral concept of leadership devised by the French Scholar Henri 
Fayol, the father of modern operational management theory. In his seminal 
 
 154. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, LEADERSHIP 244 (1978); see also Boas Shamir, Robert J. 
House & Michael B. Arthur, The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: A Self-Concept 
Based Theory, 4 ORG. SCI. 577, 577 (1993). 
 155. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER S. STEWART, HUNTING THE TIGER: THE FAST LIFE AND VIOLENT 
DEATH OF THE BALKANS’ MOST DANGEROUS MAN (2007) (discussing Željko Ražnatović, leader of the 
transnational Serb paramilitary group Arkan’s Tigers). 
 156. ORI BRAFMAN & ROD A. BECKSTROM, THE STARFISH AND THE SPIDER: THE UNSTOPPABLE 
POWER OF LEADERLESS ORGANIZATIONS 92 (2006) (“In open organizations, a catalyst is the person 
who initiates a circle and then fades away into the background.”). 
 157. As an advisor to the SWGCA, the author observed that the SWGCA replaced the final conduct 
verb of Article 6(a) of the London Charter, “waging”( “waging of a war of aggression”) with 
“execution.” It was decided that waging did not fit as well as “execution” with “act of aggression” or 
“armed attack,” and that the terms captured similar conduct. 
 158. See Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, supra note 139, at ¶ 1; Chairman’s 2007 Non-Paper 
on Defining the Individual’s Conduct, supra note 139, at ¶ 13 (“Without disregarding the different 
preferences of individual States, it is probably fair to say that no one present at Princeton 2007 would 
stay in the way of consensus about the conduct clause were the Review Conference tomorrow.”); 2002 
Discussion Paper, supra note 111, at ¶ 4. 
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1917 text, “Administration industrielle et générale,”159 Fayol proposed five 
“primary functions of management”: planning, organizing, commanding, 
coordinating, and controlling.160 Fayol’s primary functions of management 
and the behavioral approach he devised match so closely with the conduct 
verbs and concept of leadership of the London Charter—planning, 
preparation, initiation, and waging—that there is a strong case to be made 
that the drafters of the London Charter were influenced by the Frenchman’s 
work.161 Furthermore, Fayol’s principles of management—specialization of 
labor, authority, discipline, unity of command, unity of direction (top-
down), subordination of individual interests, fair remuneration, 
centralization, formal chain of command, order, equity of treatment, limited 
turnover of personnel, initiative, and cohesion among personnel—coincide 
closely with the description of the Nazi organization as a bureaucracy that 
the IMT sets out in its judgment.162 
Whether Fayol’s “primary functions of management” directly or 
indirectly inspired the conduct verbs in the London Charter and, 
subsequently, the SWGCA link between the individual and the 
state/collective act, is an interesting historical question. However, it is not 
Fayol’s theory that is most significant for this analysis, but the scholarship 
of his primary critic, the Canadian management scholar, Henry 
Mintzberg.163 Mintzberg offers an appraisal of Fayol’s work that sheds 
light on the concept of individual culpability used by the Nuremberg 
tribunal. In Mintzberg’s empirical studies of managerial work, spanning the 
1970s and 1980s, he studies managers of all sorts164 and analyzes whether 
his subjects spend their time planning, organizing, influencing, leading, and 
controlling. “A synthesis of these findings,” concludes Mintzberg, “paints 
an interesting picture. One as different from Fayol’s classic view165 as a 
cubist abstract is from a renaissance painting.” Mintzberg finds that 
managerial behaviors are far more fragmented—giving out a gold watch, 
 
 159. HENRI FAYOL, ADMINISTRATION INDUSTRIELLE ET GÉNÉRALE (Paris, 1917) (also available as 
HENRI FAYOL, INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (J.A. Coubrough trans., 1930)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Fayol’s treatise and the English translation were published soon before the London Charter 
was negotiated. By the time of the negotiations, his work was widely known. 
 162. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 175-83. 
 163. See HENRY MINTZBERG, THE NATURE OF MANAGERIAL WORK (Prentice-Hall 1980) (1973); 
See also Henry Mintzberg, The Manager’s Job: Folklore and Fact, 53 HARV. BUS. REV. 49 (1975), 
(reprinted Mar.-Apr. 1990) [hereinafter Mintzberg 1975]. 
 164. See Mintzberg 1975, supra note 163, at 164 (“Foremen, factory supervisors, staff managers, 
field sales managers, hospital administrators presidents of companies and nations, and even street gang 
leaders.”). 
 165. According to Mintzberg, the French industrialist Henri Fayol introduced the words planning, 
organizing, influencing, leading and controlling in 1916 to describe what managers do. Id. at 163. 
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attending a conference, making calls after a factory burns down—and, on 
the basis of these findings, he issues a warning, “don’t be surprised if you 
can’t relate what you see to these words.”166 
In accordance with Mintzberg’s critique, the Nuremberg Tribunal fails 
to consistently operationalize and/or apply the conduct verbs from Article 
6(a) of the London Charter to the behavior of individual defendants. One 
possible explanation, derived from Mintzberg’s work, is that while the 
conduct verbs describe what leaders do, they are too abstract to guide the 
judge’s interpretations and produce consistent results throughout the 
judgment, especially given the diverse activities in which leaders engage.167 
“Planning,” the conduct verb that received the most attention in the IMT 
judgment, serves a dual function as both a conduct verb and as an element 
of the separate crime of conspiracy, but was defined predominantly along 
the shallow lines of attendance at Hitler’s key meetings in order for the 
tribunal to establish the minimum mens rea of knowledge of Hitler’s 
aggressive plans.168 Betraying the tribunal’s difficulty in precisely 
delineating the bounds of planning, the justices noted in the final judgment 
that 
[p]lanning and preparation are essential to the making of war. . . . 
[A]gressive war is a crime under International Law. The Charter defines 
this offence [sic] as planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war 
of aggression “or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment . . . of the forgoing.” The Indictment follows this 
distinction. Count One charges the Common Plan or Conspiracy. Count 
Two charges the planning and waging of war. The same evidence[, 
attendance at Hitler’s key meetings] has been introduced to support both 
counts. We shall therefore discuss both counts together, as they are in 
substance the same.169 
Absent defined bounds, “preparation” is likewise difficult to employ 
consistently given the myriad of activities that can be considered to fall 
under the term. The tribunal evinced this difficulty throughout its 
judgment, as it repeatedly confused its conception of the term. At one 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Roger Clark, in his analysis of the conduct verbs in the London Charter’s crime against peace 
and their application by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg concludes, “It is all very 
rough and ready, both in the general explanations and in applying the Charter to the individuals. The 
ultimate challenge that Nuremberg leaves us with in respect of the crime against peace is whether 
twenty-first century drafters can do better than those in London sixty-one years ago. It is still a daunting 
task.” Roger Clark, Nuremberg and the Crime Against Peace, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 527, 
550 (2007). 
 168. E.g., Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 423-25, 447-49; 1 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings 
2-11 (1945). 
 169. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 447. 
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extreme, the IMT determined early in its judgment that Mein Kampf, the 
book written by Hitler in prison, constituted preparation. “Mein Kampf, the 
justices concluded, 
was no mere private diary . . . . The general contents are well known. 
Over and over again Hitler asserted his belief in the necessity of force as 
the means of solving international problems . . . . Mein Kampf is not to 
be regarded as a mere literary exercise . . . . Its importance lies in the 
unmistakable attitude of aggression revealed throughout its pages.170 
At the other end of the spectrum, Hitler’s meetings with his highest-
ranking military commanders was also considered preparation.171 Adding to 
its confusion, the tribunal also arbitrarily placed “preparation” both before 
and after Hitler’s plans to invade surrounding countries.172 Discussing the 
conquest of Austria, the IMT noted that “[t]he invasion of Austria was a 
premeditated aggressive step in furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars 
against other countries.”173 It is unclear from this declaration when 
preparation ended, and when execution of the Second World War began. 
Clearly, the invasion of Austria was a necessary and preliminary step in 
Hitler’s grand plan to conquer Europe, but it was also an act of aggression 
itself. Can the same action be simultaneously an aggressive war and a 
preparatory step? At what point did Hitler’s preparation end and his war on 
Europe begin, and on which side of the dividing line should the annexation 
of the Sudetenland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia fall? The tribunal’s 
blurred hints provide no answer.174 These conduct verbs, applied today, risk 
violating the principle of legality contained in Article 22, paragraph 2 of 
the Rome Statute which forewarns, in the second sentence, “[i]n case of 
ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour [sic] of the person 
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”175 
6. Suggested Modifications and/or Interpretations 
The solution, based on Mintzberg’s critique of Fayol, is to further 
flesh out the properties of the conduct verbs, which, as they stand, are 
abstract enough to capture both classic and contemporary concepts of 
 
 170. Id. at 422-23. 
 171. Id. at 423-25. 
 172. E.g., id. at 425-42. 
 173. Id. at 425. 
 174. Roger Clark has an alternative explanation: “My take on Sudetenland etc is not that the 
Tribunal had trouble with the verbs, but that it got hung up on the ‘war’ requirement.” E-mail from 
Roger Clark, Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law – Camden, to Noah Weisbord, Visiting 
Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law (Nov. 2, 2009 15:43:08 EST) (on file with author); 
See Roger Clark, Nuremberg and the Crime Against Peace, 6 WASH. UNIV. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
527, 535 (2007). 
 175. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 22, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 104. 
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leadership. Properties can be drawn from the jurisprudence of the nations 
participating in the negotiations. Legal scholars can assist the SWGCA by 
setting out, analyzing, and commenting upon the content of the conduct 
verbs in their jurisdictions. The properties of these Nuremberg-era conduct 
verbs, at least, should be forward-looking in order to capture new 
contingencies. 
There are two different ways that new properties can be incorporated 
into the definition of aggression. The drafters might include a list of 
culpable behaviors for each conduct verb in the official document 
describing the elements of the crime of aggression. The elements offer 
guidance to the bench that is more specific than the provision itself, in 
particular, pertaining to the conduct, consequences, and circumstances 
associated with each crime.176 The elements, however, are only meant to 
clarify what was agreed upon in the definition. The risk of re-opening the 
discussion, once again, is deadlock at the review conference 
Alternatively, the ASP might leave it to the judges to interpret the 
terms. While deferring the question to the judges would help the delegates 
at the 2010 review conference to avoid another last minute controversy, 
this approach risks results similar to the Nuremberg judgment unless the 
ICC judges are aware of the problem identified by Mintzberg and prepared 
to flesh out the properties of the conduct verbs in their judgments. Even 
then, the defendant at the first aggression case, who will be on trial before 
the judges flesh out the properties of the conduct verbs, will be justified in 
raising Article 22, paragraph 2, the principle of legality, in his or her 
defense. This is a perennial point of contention of relying on judges to 
develop criminal law jurisprudence in the common law style in a mixed 
system (common and civil) of international criminal law. 
When contemplating properties of the conduct verbs, the ASP or the 
bench should not only look to definitions of individual conduct from past 
judicial decisions, but also account for future contingencies. Face-to-face 
meetings convened by a leader and his ministers accompanied by redacted 
minutes are one way among many that planning takes place today. 
Alternatively, people who have never met who are advancing divergent 
agendas, such as local religious leaders and transnational criminal 
gangsters, may be involved in the same aggressive plan for different 
reasons and communicate through signals on a publicly accessible web site. 
Different contributions to the planning of swarming attacks should also be 
 
 176. See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 
(2000), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/iccelementsofcrimes.html (discussing 
elements of crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). 
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contemplated, as swarming is an increasingly prevalent method of 
contemporary warfare and is, according to some forecasts, likely to become 
still more important in the foreseeable future.177 The swarming 
phenomenon may offer insights about the core properties of the concept of 
planning that should be considered. Ideally, the definition of planning will 
be cast specifically enough to forewarn potential perpetrators that their 
involvement may be criminal, yet broadly enough to allow for different 
ways that the meeting of minds can take place. Examples of key properties 
of the concept of planning drawn from national jurisprudence are the 
existence of a proposal, the level of detail of the proposal, the level of 
involvement of an individual in the proposal, the intent that the illegal 
result should come about, and a meeting of minds (not necessarily in 
person) where two or more people are involved. Whenever possible, 
empirically verifiable indicators of the prohibited conduct should be 
included as properties of the conduct verb. The challenge for drafters and 
interpreters of the conduct verbs, like the drafters and interpreters of any 
criminal prohibition, is to satisfy the demands of legality, a backward-
looking concept, while accommodating future contingencies. While the 
judges have a variety of interpretive tools at their disposal to delineate the 
contours of the concept, the diplomats negotiating the definition must base 
its contours on the agreement they are able to achieve. 
C. Liability Doctrine: Conspiracy, Command Responsibility, Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, and Future Aggression Scenarios 
When it comes to crimes committed by “the action of a multitude of 
persons,” 178—the crime of aggression is the paradigmatic example179—
individuals usually commit parts of the whole. Any successful concept of 
liability for the crime of aggression must convincingly place the individual 
contribution in the context of the collective act so that the individual 
punishment fits each individual’s contribution to the collective crime. 
Towards this end, the legal systems of the world have generated a number 
of concepts meant to apportion individual blame for collective acts. 
Conspiracy, organizational guilt, superior (or command) responsibility, and 
 
 177. See JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, SWARMING & THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT vii (2000) 
(“Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to 
strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from 
stand-off positions. It will work best—perhaps it will only work—if it is designed mainly around the 
deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units (what we call “pods” organized in 
“clusters”)”). 
 178. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 181 (2003). 
 179. But see ROBB, supra note 54, at 8-9 (describing the superempowered individual). 
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joint criminal enterprise (or enterprise participation) are four examples. 
Joint criminal enterprise, specially tailored, is the most promising 
conceptual link for the crime of aggression. Joint criminal enterprise finds 
its roots in the older doctrine of conspiracy. 
1. Conceptual Roots and Properties of the Liability Doctrines 
Conspiracy, an inchoate crime arising out of the common law 
tradition,180 is an agreement by individuals to commit an unlawful act, with 
the intent of each individual to achieve the collective purpose, and minimal 
conduct that furthers the agreement.181 The concept of conspiracy has not 
been accepted by most civil law jurisdictions, which, instead, prohibit 
“criminal association,” a much narrower offense.182 In contemporary 
international criminal law, which melds civil and common law traditions, 
conspiracy applies only to the crime of genocide,183 on the theory that 
genocide is the most heinous crime, and a permissive doctrine is justified in 
order to ensure that perpetrators are punished.184 To accord with civilian 
sensibilities—over half the world’s nations are civil law jurisdictions—the 
concept that connects the individual to the collective act of aggression 
should be narrower than conspiracy. 
In the wake of World War II, the Allied Powers, facing the prospect of 
trying thousands of defendants, incorporated a novel concept of 
organizational guilt into the London Charter that was inspired by the 
common law concept of conspiracy.185 In accordance with this concept, 
whose creation is attributed to United States War Department lawyer 
Murray Bernays, the Nazi organizations would be indicted and tribunals 
would penalize individual membership itself, thereby shifting the burden 
onto the defendant to prove that they were coerced into joining in order to 
 
 180. Inchoate Crimes are “acts that: (i) are preparatory to prohibited offenses, (ii) have not been 
completed, therefore have not yet caused any harm, and (iii) are punished on their own, that is, in spite 
of he fact that they have not led to a complete offense.” CASSESE, supra note 178, at 190. 
 181. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (8th ed. 2004). Conspiracy arose from the common law and 
does not exist in many civil law jurisdictions. Rachael Lorna Johnstone, State Responsibility: A 
Concerto for Court, Council and Committee, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 63, 71 (2008). 
 182. See Alexander D. Tripp, Comment, Margins of the Mob: A Comparison of Reves v. Ernst & 
Young with Criminal Association Laws in Italy and France, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 263 (1996). 
 183. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2(3)(b), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M 
1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
 184. CASSESE, supra note 178, at 191. 
 185. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, London Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, arts. 9-10, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]. 
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escape punishment.186 The IMT was troubled by Barnays’ concept and 
modified it in its judgment, ruling that the prosecution must prove, amongst 
other requirements, that individual members were aware of the collective 
purpose of the organization in order to justify punishment.187 Meanwhile, 
the Nuremberg provision on crimes against peace, Article 6(a) of the 
London Charter, included its own notion of individual responsibility for 
collective action whereby conspiracy to commit crimes against peace was 
an independent inchoate crime. The tribunal left the concept in Article 6(a) 
intact and found eight of the twenty-two defendants guilty under the 
provision.188 
The Nuremberg concept of organizational guilt does not gracefully 
accommodate post-bureaucratic organizations with no formal membership 
requirement and weak links between members who participate in criminal 
acts for diverse reasons. Furthermore, the Nuremberg-era crime of 
conspiracy is a separate offense, not a link between a state/group act of 
aggression and an individual. In short, the Nuremberg-era link is not an 
ideal component for the SWGCA’s draft definition of aggression. 
The modern concept of superior (or command) responsibility is 
another legal solution to the problem of attributing individual responsibility 
for collective action. The concept is often traced to the Lieber Code,189 the 
Hague Conventions of 1907,190 and the trial of Emil Muller in Leipzig after 
World War I.191 According to Professor Mark Osiel, “[s]uperior 
 
 186. See Stanislaw Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organizations, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 213, 215-16 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990); see also 
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 75 (1992). 
 187. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 469 (“A criminal organization is analogous to a 
criminal conspiracy in that the essence of both is cooperation for criminal purposes. There must be a 
group bound together and organized for a common purpose. The group must be formed or used in 
connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the declaration with respect 
to the organizations and groups will, as has been pointed out, fix the criminality of its members, that 
definition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the 
organization and those who were drafted by the State for membership, unless they were personally 
implicated in the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the 
organization. Membership alone is not enough to come within the scope of these declarations.”). 
 188. Pomorski, supra note 186, at 235. 
 189. Francis Lieber, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
THE FIELD, BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, APRIL 24, (1863), reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY 
HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45, 45-71 (1983). 
 190. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 
T.S. 539 (1907); Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva 
Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. 543. 
 191. See German War Trials: Judgment in the Case of Emil Muller (May 30, 1921), reprinted in 16 
AM. J. INT’L L. 684 (1922); see also Stuart E. Hendin, Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in 
the Twentieth Century-A Century of Evolution, 10 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n1/hendin101nf.html#Up%20to%201900_T; Edoardo 
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responsibility places a decided emphasis—both rhetorical and 
substantive—on the chain of command and how power passes through it, 
from top to bottom. It stresses the formal, hierarchical structure of military 
organizations.”192 Allison Danner and Jenny Martinez describe two forms 
of command responsibility: active and passive.193 In active command 
responsibility, the leader takes active steps to bring about a crime, while in 
passive command responsibility, the leader “knew or had reason to know 
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the 
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.” 194 To prove either form of 
superior responsibility, the prosecutor must show the required mens rea 
(the superior “knew or had reason to know”), a superior-subordinate 
relationship, and the superior’s failure to prevent or punish the 
subordinates’ wrongs.195 Osiel observes that superior responsibility 
comports with the sociological features of mass atrocity “where criminal 
policymaking and control over events concentrate at the top of a 
bureaucratic hierarchy.” 196 
The concept of superior responsibility becomes nonsensical when 
applied to the crime of aggression. Because the crime of aggression is, by 
definition, a crime committed by superiors, superiors cannot be held 
responsible for crimes of aggression committed by their subordinates. The 
leadership qualifier in the emerging SWGCA definition, which limits the 
concept to “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State,” makes the emerging crime 
incompatible with the existing doctrine of superior responsibility as 
contained in Article 28 of the Rome Statute. This leaves the drafters of the 
crime of aggression two options: they can add a clause to the crime 
explicitly excluding Article 28, or they can leave it to the judges to 
recognize the clumsy conceptual fit and avoid the doctrine of superior 
 
Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law, 835 INT’L R. OF 
THE RED CROSS 531 (Oct. 30, 1999). These materials provide short histories of the concept of superior 
responsibility. 
 192. Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1751, 1770 (2005). 
 193. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 120 
(2005). 
 194. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7(3), May 25, 
1993, 32 I.L.M 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda art. 6(3), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1602; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999. 
 195. ICTY Statute, supra note 194, art. 7(3). 
 196. Osiel, supra note 192, at 1770. 
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responsibility altogether when judging individuals for the crime of 
aggression. 
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE), rather than superior 
responsibility or conspiracy, in light of the scenarios set out in Part II and 
the conceptual considerations just described, is the most appropriate 
liability doctrine for the definition for the crime of aggression. 
2. Proposed Liability Doctrine for the Crime of Aggression 
JCE is rapidly becoming the most important concept in international 
criminal law to apportion individual blame for collective acts and can serve 
as a widely accepted liability doctrine for the crime of aggression. In its 
first decision, Tadic, the ICTY read the doctrine of JCE into its statute.197 
The core of the concept of enterprise participation is “a common plan, 
design or purpose which amounts to . . . the commission of a crime.”198 The 
ICTY has categorized three forms of enterprise participation: shared intent 
to bring about a certain offense,199 organized systems of repression and ill-
treatment,200 and criminal acts beyond the common design, but “a natural 
and foreseeable consequence of effecting” it.201 The first indictment relying 
“explicitly on JCE was confirmed on June 25, 2001.”202 According to 
Danner and Martinez, 
Of the forty-two indictments filed between that date and January 1, 2004, 
twenty-seven (64%) rely explicitly on JCE. . . . 
. . . If all indictments that include charges that the defendant acted ‘in 
concert’ with others are viewed as implicitly employing a JCE theory, 
then thirty-four of the forty-three indictments confirmed between June 
25, 2001 and January 1, 2004 (81% of the total) incorporate JCE.203 
Five years after the concept of JCE was read into the ICTY Statute, it 
was explicitly incorporated into the Rome Statute of the ICC in Article 
25(3)(d). The ICC can, and likely will, choose to build on the ICTY 
jurisprudence when interpreting the statutory provision on JCE. 
The strength of the concept of JCE, in light of the changing nature of 
organizations, is its capacity to locate individual responsibility within a 
wide range of organizational models. The emphasis of superior 
responsibility, as Osiel points out, is on the chain of command, while 
 
 197. Danner & Martinez, supra note 193, at 104 (describing how the International Criminal 
Tribunal of Yugoslavia read the JCE into Art. 7(1) of the ICTY Statute). 
 198. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 772 (Jan. 14, 2000). 
 199. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 195 (July 15, 1999). 
 200. Id. ¶ 202. 
 201. Id. ¶ 204. 
 202. Danner & Martinez, supra note 193, at 107. 
 203. Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted). 
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enterprise participation “is more consonant with differing dimensions of 
mass atrocity, where malevolent influence travels through informal and 
widely dispersed networks.”204 The weakness of the JCE concept is its 
breadth. Unlike the concept of conspiracy, which relies on an actual 
agreement among individuals, JCE is based on a legal fiction—that the 
individual participants are united by a common purpose, a common 
purpose imagined by the bench.205 Because the concept is based on a legal 
fiction, it suffers from a serious weakness from the perspective of legality. 
The defendant cannot know how expansively the tribunal will imagine the 
common purpose to be prior to its determination, and therefore, whether he 
or she will be included within the ambit of the crime. For this reason, 
critics of the concept of JCE, such as Osiel, consider it to be “dangerously 
illiberal.”206 
However, the JCE doctrine, when applied to the definition of the 
crime of aggression, becomes bounded by the crime’s leadership qualifier. 
Only leaders of the common plan to commit aggression, individuals “in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct” the common plan 
(or, under one formulation proposed above, “a [central/focal] person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over, [determinatively influence,] or 
to direct the political or military action of a State [/Group]”) are included 
within the ambit of the concept. This answers critics, such as Osiel, and 
makes the concept of JCE viable from the perspective of liberal legalism. If 
tribunals continue to create additional categories of JCE, some specifically 
tailored to the crime of aggression, the concept, “consonant with the 
differing dimensions of mass atrocity,”207 will become still more 
predictable and comport increasingly closely with the concept of legality. 
The future of individual accountability for the collective crime of 
aggression lies in progressively refining the properties of the doctrine of 
JCE. 
3. Recap and Postscript to Part IV 
The conceptual link between the individual and the collective act of 
aggression is, as Part IV demonstrates, made up of three properties: a 
leadership clause, four conduct verbs, and one or more liability doctrines. 
Part IV argues that, in addition to formal or effective control, centrality 
within a social network and the influence of an individual within that 
network should be included as properties of the leadership clause. In 
 
 204. Osiel, supra note 192, at 177. 
 205. Id. at 1771 n.92. 
 206. Id. at 1772. 
 207. Id. at 1770. 
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addition, the solution to the problem with the conduct verbs, based on 
Mintzberg’s critique of Fayol, is to further flesh out the properties of those 
verbs, which are abstract enough to capture both classic and contemporary 
concepts of leadership. Finally, the liability doctrine of JCE, tempered by 
the leadership clause of the crime of aggression, rather than the doctrines of 
superior responsibility or conspiracy, is the most appropriate option for the 
definition for the crime of aggression. 
There is, in fact, a fourth conceptual link that this article does not 
address in detail because I consider it in an earlier study—the modes of 
participation in the crime of aggression contained in Article 25(3) of the 
Rome Statute.208 An important conceptual consideration related to the 
modes of participation that I do not address in detail in that earlier study is 
the uneasy relationship between the conduct verbs (planning, preparation, 
initiation, and execution).209 and the modes of participation set out in 
Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of the Rome Statute. The following chart eschews 
structural theories of perpetration,210 which have only confounded the 
SWGCA debate, and instead presents each mode of perpetration and 
participation in relation to each conduct verb contained in the SWGCA 
definition (plus the leadership qualifier), with the aim of evaluating the 
resulting concepts of perpetration/participation that emerge. Problematic 
concepts are shaded in gray and the reason they are problematic is 
described below the chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 208. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 190. 
 209. See supra Part IV.B. 
 210. See generally Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 781 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John 
R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002) (describing how true “actors” and mere “accomplices” are both perpetrators 
and indistinguishable under the unitary perpetrator concept, whereas perpetrators and mere participants 
are distinguishable under the differential participation concept since perpetrators have a more direct role 
to play in the commission of the crime than participants in terms of causation and are therefore more 
blameworthy). 
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  Conduct Verbs in the SWCCA Definition 
  PLAN PREPARE INITIATE EXECUTE 
Commits  
Individually 
A leader 
individually 
plans the 
commission of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
A leader 
individually 
prepares for the 
commission of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [1].  
A leader 
individually 
initiates the 
commission of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader 
individually 
executes the 
commission of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [2].  
Commits  
Jointly 
A leader jointly 
plans the 
commission of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader jointly 
prepares the 
commission of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader jointly 
initiates the 
commission of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
A leader jointly 
executes the 
commission of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
Perpetration in Article 25(3) 
Commits 
Through 
Another 
Through another, 
a leader plans the 
commission of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
Through another, 
a leader prepares 
the commission 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
Through another, 
a leader initiates 
the commission 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [3].  
Through another, 
a leader executes 
the commission 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
Orders A leader orders 
the planning of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader orders 
the preparation 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader orders 
the initiating of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader orders 
the execution of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
Solicits A leader solicits 
the planning of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
A leader solicits 
the preparation 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
A leader solicits 
the initiation of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
A leader solicits 
the execution of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
Induces A leader induces 
the planning of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
A leader induces 
the preparation 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
A leader induces 
the initiation of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [4]. 
A leader induces 
the execution of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack. 
Assists A leader assists 
the planning of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [5]. 
A leader assists 
the preparation 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [6]. 
A leader orders 
the initiation of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [7]. 
A leader assists 
the execution of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [8]. 
Participation in Article 25(3) 
Provides 
Means for 
the 
Commission 
A leader 
provides the 
means for the 
commission of 
the planning of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [9].  
A leader 
provides the 
means for the 
commission of 
the preparation 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader 
provides the 
means for the 
commission of 
the initiation of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [10].  
A leader 
provides the 
means for the 
commission of 
the execution of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
 Attempts A leader attempts 
the planning of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack [11].  
A leader attempts 
the preparation 
of an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader attempts 
the initiation of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
A leader attempts 
the execution of 
an act of 
aggression/armed 
attack.  
 
[1] If a leader prepares individually, there is no one being led. 
[2] A collective act cannot be executed individually by a leader. 
COPY OF WEISBORD_FMT3.NOV18.DOC 11/20/2009  12:53:44 PM 
62 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:1 
[3] If a leader initiates “through another,” how is this different from 
just initiating by him or herself? 
[4] If a leader induces the initiation, how is this different from just 
initiating by him or herself? 
[5,6,7,8] Can a leader be an assistant? The word “assists” pertains to 
the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of an act of 
aggression/armed attack. 
[9] What “means for the commission” of planning does the working 
group have in mind? Computers, maps, expert military planners? 
[10] What means for the commission of initiation are necessary? 
Communication devices? 
[11] Under 25(3)(f) of the Rome Statute, an attempt is an action that 
constitutes a “substantial step” toward the execution of a crime. Does an 
incomplete plan constitute a substantial enough step to justify criminal 
responsibility and punishment? 
There are two possible avenues the ASP can take in response to these 
observations. The ASP can replace the existing conduct verbs with verbs 
that are more compatible with Article 25(3). The advantage of his approach 
is that, with careful attention to compatibility, the resulting crime would be 
more conceptually elegant than the existing concept. Alternatively, the ASP 
can accept that some of the modes of perpetration and participation 
resulting from the interaction of the leadership clause in the definition, the 
conduct verbs in the definition, and the terms in Article 25(3) of the Rome 
Statute, are conceptually problematic and leave it to the judges to avoid 
them (i.e., the shaded boxes). One advantage of this approach, which 
comes at the expense of conceptual elegance, is that it avoids another 
protracted debate in the run-up to the review conference by proceeding on 
the basis of conduct verbs that states have already agreed to. Another 
advantage is that these conduct verbs, borrowed from the London Charter, 
have historical resonance. The risk of using the existing model is that an 
aggressive prosecutor or an activist bench will one day exploit the 
conceptual confusion as an avenue to interpret the provision to capture a 
wider range of perpetrators and participants than the signatories to the 
statute intended. The above chart offers clearer guidance than structural 
theories of perpetration and participation as the ASP defines the crime, 
judges interpret it, and legal scholars evaluate their judgments. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A. Evaluating the Methodology 
The combined scenario planning and grounded theory methodology 
that this article begins to develop has strengths and weaknesses as an 
approach to drafting the definition of the crime of aggression. The most 
important strength is that the methodology shifts the gaze of the drafters 
from events that have already occurred and agreements already reached to 
the sociological phenomenon that the Assembly intends to regulate and 
back again. In this way, it strikes a balance between fidelity to the past and 
preparedness for the future. The grounded theory approach, unlike a priori 
methodologies, focuses the attention of the drafters on the conceptual fit of 
the definition and the sociological phenomenon they intend to regulate. It 
offers an incremental way for lawmakers to shape a definition that does not 
rely on an initial agreement on a priori assumptions. Taken together, 
scenario planning and grounded theory methodologies are more likely than 
methodologies focused predominantly on precedent and tradition or efforts 
based upon an initial normative agreement to guide the drafters to a well-
tailored and relevant definition. 
What the proposed methodology cannot do is remove politics from the 
negotiations. Just as SWGCA delegations chose their preferred precedents 
with their nations’ interests in mind, they are likely to choose their favorite 
scenarios to advance their political and military interests as well. 
Ultimately, the proposed method can only produce an analytically ideal 
definition to the limits of what is politically possible. My hope is that 
through an open discussion of scenarios and constituent concepts, the 
proposed methodology will help clarify the normative commitments of the 
drafters so that these commitments can be better accounted for in the 
negotiations. If politics is to be tethered to process, as the diplomats 
drafting the crime of aggression seem to prefer, the process would do well 
to accurately reflect their interests so that these interests are properly taken 
into account in the final product. 
In addition to balancing fidelity to the past and preparedness for the 
future, the proposed method offers a systematic way to move from the 
concrete to the abstract and vice versa. This is the primary contribution of 
grounded theory. The existing definition contains concrete aspects, such as 
the list of acts of aggression in Paragraph 2 (invasion, bombardment, 
blockade, etc.), and abstract parts, such as Paragraph 1 (characterizing an 
act of aggression as a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations), but these are more often than not inherited from the hodgepodge 
of precedents that are the building blocks of the definition. The proposed 
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method seeks to more deliberately build concreteness and specificity into 
the definition so that the final definition best fits the phenomena it is meant 
to regulate. Once again, however, the imperative of designing a definition 
that best fits the target phenomena and the realities of politics are regularly 
at odds. “Constructive ambiguity”211 and a focus on “relative particulars”212 
are not only tools to tailor the definition to a social phenomena, they are 
also tools the diplomats use to reach an agreement. The proposed method, 
ultimately, is incapable of fully disentangling the two uses. 
B. Directions for Future Research 
Future research might usefully address the above critiques by 
suggesting specific qualitative and quantitative methodological procedures 
that would strengthen the overall method. There are no doubt methods of 
lawmaking employed in other contexts, both domestic and international, 
which address the challenges of drafting a definition that is certain enough 
to guide behavior yet flexible enough to capture new contingencies and 
where consensus is difficult to reach because of disagreement about first 
principles. A useful follow-up study would compare a number of these 
methods, draw general lessons about their applicability in a range of 
contexts, and also about the challenge of lawmaking in the midst of rapid 
social change. Another direction for future research is to apply the scenario 
planning and grounded theory approach in a more fine-grained way to 
particular components of the definition of the crime of aggression, such as 
the concept of armed attack or the leadership clause. Alternatively, the 
methodology might be tested in a new drafting scenario, such as the 
drafting of a municipal regulation. In short, the methodology that this paper 
introduces is preliminary and requires more study. 
In relation to the crime of aggression, new research is needed on the 
jurisdictional conditions and, in particular, possible solutions to the 
controversy in the working group over the appropriate role for the Security 
Council in the ICC’s legal process.213 The question of whether the Security 
Council should have primary or exclusive authority to authorize an 
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aggression case has not yet been resolved and it is sure to pose a challenge 
at the 2010 review conference.214 Here, Sunstein’s scholarship on 
incompletely theorized agreements, mentioned in the introduction, offers a 
promising place to start. 
Another important question that legal academics might help resolve is 
the mechanism for the entry into force of the definition and the 
jurisdictional conditions of the crime. The ASP will need to decide whether 
Article 121(4) of the Rome Statute, 121(5), or some combination of the two 
controls the entry into force of the aggression provisions.215 Article 121(4) 
requires seven-eighths of the ICC’s States Parties to deposit their 
ratifications or acceptance of the amendment with the UN Secretary 
General before the amendment comes into force. Once this threshold is 
reached, the amendment binds all States Parties. Article 121(5), by 
contrast, only requires acceptance by two-thirds of States parties to come 
into force. However, it only binds States Parties that have deposited 
instruments of ratification or acceptance. One important and unresolved 
controversy is which article—or combination of articles—should be 
employed. Another key question requiring further research is how the 
definition of aggression would apply to States Parties that have not 
accepted the amendment under either 121(5) and to non-states parties 
attacked or attacking a State Party.216 
C. The Future of the Crime of Aggression 
The criminal prohibition of international aggression has been an 
aspiration among legal scholars and statesmen for approximately a 
century—at least since the Allied victors of World War I tried 
unsuccessfully to try Kaiser Wilhelm II and hold him responsible for the 
war.217 The idea is both sticky and resilient. The repeated attempts to define 
and enforce the crime of aggression since the Nuremberg Trials indicate 
that the idea has captured the legal imagination and that it will continue to 
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attract new supporters, even after repeated failures to implement it. The 
adoption of the Rome Treaty in 1998, a major advance in the rapidly 
evolving post Cold-War international criminal justice system, has created a 
context in which the crime may finally be defined and enforced. Four 
possible scenarios present themselves. 
The first scenario is that the Review Conference agrees upon a 
definition and jurisdictional conditions in 2010. Judging from the SWGCA 
negotiations, if states agree upon a definition, it will be a narrow one. The 
risk is that the ICC will only apply the definition to isolated leaders in weak 
states. The hope is that states will incorporate the definition into their 
national criminal codes, as many have begun to do even pending an 
amendment to the Rome Statute, and that the definition will help 
discourage political and military leaders from attacking their neighbors.218 
Another possible scenario is that states will agree upon a definition in 
2010, but not the jurisdictional conditions. In this case, the ICC will not be 
able to prosecute aggression cases until States Parties at a subsequent 
review conference amend the Rome Statute to add a jurisdictional trigger. 
In this scenario, States Parties incorporating the definition into their 
national criminal laws will still be able to prosecute aggression cases, even 
if the ICC is not. The day may come when the definition is widely accepted 
in national jurisdictions and this generates enough momentum among 
States Parties to insert jurisdictional conditions into the Rome Statute, 
allowing the ICC to proceed. 
A third scenario is that the Review Conference fails to agree upon 
both the definition and the jurisdictional conditions in 2010. Though this 
may result in a period where States are less motivated to define the crime, 
if the history of the twentieth century is any indication, the idea will 
resurface again at the end of a destructive armed conflict that detrimentally 
affects enough powerful states. With regular ICC review conferences on 
the horizon, there will be ample opportunity to define the crime and 
implement it when the conditions are ripe. 
Under the final scenario, the delegations fail to define the crime, the 
jurisdictional trigger, or the method of implementation at the review 
conference and the idea finally withers. Though the death of what some 
consider an ill-conceived idea may appeal to even thoughtful commentators 
within the international legal establishment,219 this scenario is unlikely. The 
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sociological changes that are allowing small groups and even individuals to 
wage war against states call for an individualistic basis of regulation. 
Though other crimes, such as terrorism, might cover similar ground, the 
crime of aggression has proven to be a legal idea too compelling to ignore 
and prone to resurface, despite definitional setbacks. 
The fate of this charismatic legal idea, it is fair to conclude, is not yet 
sealed. Studying it is valuable, whatever the outcome of the drafting 
process, because of what it reveals about the possibilities and limitations of 
international law and what the crime of aggression, one of the century’s 
most fascinating legal puzzles, inspires in terms of method. 
APPENDIX220 
Article 8 bis 
Crime of Aggression 
 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use 
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, 
regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify 
as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, 
resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of 
force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory 
of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of 
another State; 
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(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces 
of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory 
of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention 
of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their 
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at 
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating 
an act of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its 
substantial involvement therein. 
 
